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ABSTRACT
This study examined the factors affecting the perception of Turkey in the Middle East
from 2002 onwards by analyzing the combination of media, political elite discourse and
people's political predispositions in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. The research is separated
into two parts. In the first part of 2002-2010, the factors of democratization, economic
development, foreign policy activism, Islamic Oriented Government as well as Turkish TV
series were found to be critical in the explanation of Turkey's popularity.
In the second part of 2010-2013, democratization and foreign policy activism were the
most effective factors while the other variables still had some effect. In particular the study
looked at the news titles, articles, headlines in newspapers, as well as the views of journalists,
activists, bloggers, politicians, and academics, which together shaped public perception. A
brief historical background is also given in regards to the mutual prejudices and stereotypes
between Arabs and Turks during Ottoman rule and the 20th century.
The thesis concludes by emphasizing the continuation of democratic progress and
reforms in Turkey as well as the need for foreign policy adjustment according to crisis
situations as a policy recommendation for the government. The present study also seeks to
contribute to both the public opinion theory of Zaller and the recent literature on the “Turkish
Model”.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Turkey’s modernization sped up with the start of the 21st century and the rise of the
Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkish politics. The government swiftly
implemented many economic and political reforms, and many developments occurred in
terms of democratization, such as the normalization of civil-military relations, constitutional
changes enabling civil rights and liberties, and judicial reforms that reduced the role of the
secular-nationalist Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment. Turkey’s economy reached a
GDP per capita of almost $15,000 with a growth rate of approximately 8% and became the
17th largest in the world.
A new wave of activism also emerged in the foreign policy field which included
peace-building efforts between Syria and Israel and Israel and Palestine. A largely
independent foreign policy emerged with the rejection of the Bush administration`s plan to
move American troops to Iraq through Turkish territory in 2003, opposition to the sanctions
against Iran, and harsh criticism of Israel for its killings of Palestinians and the Gaza
blockade. Critics have blamed the AK Party for a shift from Western-oriented foreign policy
to one directed towards the Middle East. Critics have also labeled the government as NeoOttomanist because of its goal of improving relations with the Arab Muslim countries of the
Middle East. All these factors constituted a new “Turkish Model” which emerged first in
Western circles and gradually spread through the region and was debated amongst various
scholars of Turkish foreign policy.
The main purpose of this thesis is to find out the impact of the democratic dimension
of this so called “Turkish model”. While agreeing that all factors (such as economic
development, an Islamic-oriented government, and regional activism) are likely important for
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the rise of Turkish influence in the region, the aim of this study is to explain to what extent
and how democratization inside Turkey has affected its regional influence. Other variables
have merit in helping too. The admiration of Turkey in the Middle East occurs not just
because of its democratic governance but also for other reasons, such as regional activism,
which together form Turkey’s soft power. Other variables may also play a role as important
determinants of regional influence.
It is important to clarify the definition of regional influence. It is soft power coming
from positive regional perception among the Arab public and elites rather than influence
through military power and economy. Turkey has a limited capability, in terms of economic
and military power, to exert influence in the region. So Turkey is left with only soft power
through offering an admirable example and inspiration due to the aforementioned qualities.
However, this image of Turkey as an Islamic country with democratic government has
deteriorated in recent years, especially after the AK Party’s third term. There have been many
criticisms of the government because of a slowed down European Union membership
process. Also, it has been argued that the government has shown a tendency towards
authoritarianism by reversing democratic gains. Critics focus on the government’s refusal to
give the Kurds their natural language and cultural rights, handling the Kurdish issue from
only a military-security perspective, and declining press freedom with some journalists fired
for criticizing the government. Therefore, democratization has been selected as the main
independent variable. This is not only because of declining democratization in Turkey but
also because the region has experienced important democratic changes with the Arab Spring.
Before the Arab Spring one could argue that public opinion did not matter since many of the
countries in the Middle East were ruled by authoritarian regimes. These dictatorships did not
take into account whether their subjects had favorable opinions in regards to Turkey, and they
2

decided what kind of foreign policy to pursue, independent of public opinion. However, with
the Arab Spring and increasing democratization in the region, public opinion has become
more important, and regimes are likely to better reflect Arab people’s views. In this type of
environment, the perception of Turkey will significantly matter. Now, it is not just about
elites ruling the country arbitrarily, but the opinions of people who are very much interested
in and following the developments inside Turkey matter, too.
Hypothesis
Because of the aforementioned realities, the following hypotheses have been derived;
H1: As the level of internal democratization increases in Turkey the regional perception of
Turkey will become more positive.
H2: As the level of foreign policy activism increases in Turkey the regional perception of
Turkey will become more positive.
H3: As the level of economic development increases in Turkey the regional perception of
Turkey will become more positive.
H4: As the level of Islamic orientation or policies of the government increases in Turkey the
regional perception of Turkey will become more positive.
H5: As the number of TV series widespread in the region increases in Turkey the regional
perception of Turkey will become more positive.
As one can see from these hypothesis, other independent variables include economic
development, Islamic-oriented government, foreign policy activism, and Turkish TV series.
In line with the hypothesized effect, there is likely an important positive relationship
between internal democratization and regional perception. It can also be argued that with the
3

rise of authoritarian tendencies and the reversal of democratic reforms in Turkey, the Arab
public`s perception of Turkey will become more negative, and that, in turn, will lead to the
decreasing influence of Turkey since, in the long term, many countries in the Middle East
will be in a democratic trend and care about the opinions of their citizens.
It is important to understand the extent of the effect of democratization on Turkey`s
regional perception because it will have important policy implications on behalf of Turkey, if
the findings of this research support the hypothesized effect. Turkey will have to be careful
about its democratization and domestic politics, since it is closely followed by Arab publics,
and this, in turn, will have consequences for Turkey`s regional influence and foreign policy.
In the area of popular culture which is directly linked to perception, it cannot be said
that there is a conscious government effort to spread Turkish culture to the Middle East. In
public diplomacy the government was inadequate in providing the necessary tools to increase
popularity among Arab publics. While it is undeniable that Turkish TV series have a huge
role in spreading popular culture and popularity, the government did not have a role on that.
Data/ Methods
My methodology consists of case studies of Turkey`s period of successful
democratization as well as its period of declining reforms and democratization. I will test H1
accordingly. I will look at The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) `s
2009-2012 perception of Turkey report which includes surveys and data about many
important issues regarding Turkey`s regional influence. I will compare the different years in
which TESEV`s research is conducted and see the percentage difference in Turkey`s
popularity and perception levels and other questions related to Turkey`s regional
influence/soft power/”Turkish Model”. For example, if one compares 2011 and 2012’s
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favorable opinions of Turkey, one will see a decline, on average, from 78% to 69%. 1 I argue
that this is due to the decline of democratization in these years.
TESEV which was founded in 1961 is Turkey’s leading civil society organization. It is
an independent non-governmental think tank which produces knowledge on social, political,
and economic issues mostly related to Turkey. Based in Istanbul, TESEV attempts to be a
bridge between academic research and the policy-making process in Turkey. It organizes
seminars and conferences and releases project reports, books, and policy-watch briefings
aimed at general readership. Democratization, foreign policy, and good governance are three
general program areas under which TESEV conducts research. Since 2009, TESEV has been
publishing reports on the perception of Turkey in the Middle East under the Foreign Policy
Program. 2 According to their website, TESEV “aims to promote the role of civil-society in
the democratic process and seeks to share its research findings with the widest possible
audience. TESEV focuses on the most urgent and important policy questions facing Turkey
and its neighbors in the new century.” 3
For the 2009 report, “simultaneous interviews were conducted by telephone in Egypt,
Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, and face-to-face in Iraq. A total of 2,006
people were interviewed.” 4 The survey’s questions were prepared by TESEV’s Foreign
Policy Program and KA Research Company with the support of political scientists from
various universities in Turkey. When we look at the respondents in TESEV’s 2009 report, we
see that the majority of the respondents belong to the 18-44 age groups where the young
people interviewed comprise the majority at 26%. The majority of the respondents are also
well educated with 39% having medium and 45% high education. The majority of the
respondents are also regular or daily TV viewers, newspaper readers and daily internet users. 5
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According to TESEV's website “The 2010 survey was conducted in the same seven
Arab countries but, unlike 2009, it was also conducted in Iran. In total, 2,267 people were
surveyed by telephone or face-to-face. These results show a statistically significant increase
in positive opinion of Turkey.” 6
According to the 2010 report from TESEV, “The Image of Turkey Survey in the
Middle East is a cross-country survey conducted by the mixed mode method including
Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) and Face-to Face Interviewing (F2F) by
KA Research Limited of Istanbul. Interviews were conducted among a random sample of
approximately 286 individuals aged 18 and over in the major 3 or 4 cities of the survey
countries. The questionnaire consisted of 40 substantive questions 12 demographic questions,
and 20 quality control questions. The poll has a +/- 2.06% margin of error at the regional
level and a +/- 5.8% for individual countries at the 95% confidence level.” 7 In the following
years, the number of countries and people included in the TESEV survey increased.

As an indication of its independence, TESEV has been supported by many diverse
institutions including the Soros foundation, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth office, the
World Bank, Freedom House, the European Institute, and the National Endowment for
Democracy. Despite some arguments made against the objectivity of TESEV saying that its
views are the reflection of Soros’ Open Society Foundation, a major funder, I suggest these
are biased and prejudiced opinions of people who made their decisions without even reading
the content of TESEV’s reports. 8 According to the newspaper article, Erdogan supported
TESEV’s work and his daughter even worked as an intern in TESEV. However it is definitely
not possible to argue that it is under the control of the government. It is generally deemed to
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be a liberal institution, far from the interests and ideologies of certain parties in Turkish
society. 9

Moreover I will also look at Fatih University`s Department of International Relations’
2011 and 2013 research project on the perceptions of Turkey amongst its neighbors, again
involving surveys and data about this issue. Likewise, I will use many other polls and opinion
data about the perception of Turkey. In addition to this, I will look at news titles, articles, and
headlines in the newspapers as well as the views of politicians, journalists, academics,
activists etc. and do a qualitative and interpretive analysis of journalistic and expert opinions
in selected information outlets to understand the perception of Turkey in Egypt and Tunisia.

Fatih University is a private independent research institution based in Istanbul. In
2011 its Department of International Relations published a project called “Perception of
Turkish Foreign Policy of the Elites in Neighboring Countries”. As a continuation of this
research they published another project in 2013 called “How do elites in the Middle East
Perceive Turkish Foreign Policy” but this time with an increased number of countries and
focusing on the Middle East. With the help of the department's research assistants, phone and
face to face interviews were conducted with educated elites such as academics, journalists,
graduate students, politicians etc.
In the first project, interviews were conducted with approximately 50 persons from
each country except Iran and totaling 318 persons. These people, according to the authors,
“were directly or indirectly effective individuals in the decision making process and above
the average in terms of education, economic and social status.” 10 The first project included
twenty one survey questions while the second had sixteen. In both projects survey
questionnaires were directed to the respondents asking them to choose among multiple
7

options given in the survey, and the data was derived from these answers. After analyzing the
data the results were obtained by taking percentages of respondents' answers.
The importance of democratization in Turkey will be highlighted by using several
indicators to understand the level of democracy in the different periods of AK Party’s rule.
Reports and projects evaluating Turkey’s human rights, civil liberties, freedom level, press
freedom etc. will be used to understand and operationalize my main independent variable:
democratization of Turkey. By looking at reports such as Freedom House, Press Freedom,
democracy ranking etc., it will be determined whether there is declining or increasing
democracy in the respective time periods. Then a comparison will be made by showing if an
increasing or declining democracy resulted in positive or negative public perception of
Turkey. The results of public perception reports about Turkey in the Middle East will be used
in this process. Instead of conducting an independent quantitative study, this study will
utilize existing quantitative studies and their results to test the hypotheses. Various primary
and secondary sources will be employed to show the importance of the independent variables.
The study will also try to demonstrate the further importance and hypothetically exceptional
role of democratization.
While there is enough evidence to support that democratization advanced in the first
period(2002-2010) and declined during the latter (2010-2013), there is no data (in terms of
surveys and polls) for my dependent variable showing that in the early 2002-2010 period,
perception of Turkey in the Middle East was actually favorable. My data starts from 2009
with TESEV’s reports on perceptions of Turkey. This suggests that, in terms of concrete data
with polls and surveys, this study will only look at the 2009-2013 period. However, I will
refer to other resources such as books, articles, and newspapers to see if there is an increase
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in positive Arab public perception of Turkey in the 2002-2010 period the lack of reports from
this period.
Along with Egypt, Tunisia is another good case study for examining perceptions of
Turkey in the Middle East. Since it was the first country to experience the Arab Spring, and
since it has an educated middle class and democratic political culture, it is a perfect fit for this
study’s purposes. Tunisia is also the most successful example of the “Arab Spring” in terms
of democratic development. I previously argued that interest in Turkey, the “Turkish Model”,
and Turkish democratic developments increased greatly after the Arab Spring. In Tunisia it is
very likely that perception of Turkey will improve or worsen depending on the condition of
rights and freedoms in Turkey.
The lack of sectarian considerations is another reason why I chose Tunisia. I designed
my research to be a qualitative induction, generalizing and making arguments about the
whole Middle East. However, I had to control for the Z variable which is not included in my
original variables. It is hard to include various other factors that might have affected
perception in a limited scope study like this one. Sectarian ideologies and predispositions are
excluded from my research, thus barring the study from including countries such as Iraq,
Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Whether or not Ankara would become involved in sectarian
politics, it is seen as a predominantly Sunni country and as a “Sunni Power” in Shiite
majority countries in the Middle East 11. This might limit Turkey's influence and cause
negative perceptions. Also, the bloody civil war still continuing in Syria is another reason not
to choose this country. Likewise, the decades old Israeli-Palestinian conflict may cause
problems with using Palestine as a case for this study. It was very important to keep these
additional factors constant to better test the hypotheses.

9

The question of why the researcher picked the two case studies of Egypt and Tunisia
arises as well as whether there was any bias in regards to the selection of these cases. In
response to this, first of all, the researchers face the problem of selection bias more
commonly in quantitative studies rather than qualitative case studies such as this one. Apart
from many other reasons of selecting Egypt and Tunisia, I already indicated the importance
of democratic movements and changes in the region recently, especially the role of “Arab
Spring”. I argued that after the “Arab Spring” demands and interest in democratization
increased in the region. It also put Turkey (as the most successful democracy in the region
and the example of harmony between Islam and democracy) on the agenda, and Arab publics
and elites started to closely follow developments in Turkey. In that sense, the selection of
Egypt and Tunisia as two countries that both experienced the “Arab Spring” with an educated
and enthusiastic youth favoring democracy and human rights becomes meaningful. There are
also a lot of cultural and historical ties between Turkey and these countries. I also argued as a
finding that, from more democratically experienced countries to less democratically
experienced ones, interest in democratization inside and out of those countries will decline in
the Middle East. For this reason, we might not observe similar interest and demand for
democracy in the countries that never experienced the “Arab Spring” or any other rights
movement in the region. Therefore, for example, in Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates,
people might not closely follow the condition of Turkish democracy as in Egypt and Tunisia.
This will in turn make democratization less relevant as a factor causing better perception in
contrast with other variables such as economic development or Islamic-oriented government.
One must point out that, in order to understand the perceptions of Turkey in Tunisia, it
can be necessary to analyze more than just Tunisian newspapers. The articles and news
appearing in widespread regional networks like Al-Jazeera and the Middle East Broadcasting
10

Center (which includes Al-Arabiya) also reflect Tunisian opinion since these networks are
widely followed in the Middle East. This is supported by a Gallup poll from 2007 which
reveals that citizens rely on many types of media to receive information about other
countries. Sixty six percent regarded International TV as very important while 51% said the
same for National TV, and only 38% found newspapers to be important. 12 There are many
Tunisian intellectuals writing in these international and regional networks like Larbi Sadiki
and Oussama Romdhani. Another reason to examine these regional newspapers like AlJazeera is the fact that most of the newspapers in Tunisia are either in Arabic or French
causing translation difficulties in this research.
Goals and Significance of the Research
The goal of this study is to test the initial hypothesis that democratization is an
important explanatory factor for Turkey`s regional influence, operationalized as Arab public
perception of Turkey. It must be noted that, this study does not look at regional perception in
terms of the effectiveness or success of its foreign policy in the eyes of regimes or
authoritarian leaders. Positive or negative reactions of the authoritarian regimes can be
misleading, since they may not represent public opinion. This suggests that the current
research will not be a standard foreign policy analysis; it will rather take the form of an
inquiry which purports to understand the factors affecting the public perception of Turkey
and which may cause success or failure of its regional influence.
It must be noted that all the factors are important and combine for a larger cumulative
effect. For example, economic development without an Islamic-oriented government
supporting the Palestinian cause and favoring a brotherhood policy based on culture and
religion will not give rise to a positive perception of Turkey. To be an inspiring example and
admired by the Arab public and for these publics to even label Turkey as “one of us”, Turkey
11

certainly has to show that it is a similar country in terms of values and culture. Otherwise
there will be no difference between Turkey and other countries that are much more
economically developed, such as France and Germany. It naturally follows that, to have a
positive perception, countries must see something common and similar and then think that the
same achievements could be applied in their countries as well. For instance, one is not going
to find a positive perception of France, the UK, or even the US in the Middle East if a public
opinion poll is made, although they are more advanced than Turkey economically and
democratically. Even the democratization factor does not carry much weight without factors
such as Islam, economic development, and regional activism, though it is this study’s main
hypothesis that democratization is more important than the others. Why would Turkey be an
inspiring example in terms of democracy, while there are many advanced democracies ahead
of Turkey and with Turkey showing signs of authoritarianism recently, according to many
scholars?
However there are good reasons to believe that, democratization matters a lot by
itself. Many scholars have argued that: “To solve problems with one`s neighbors and
moreover to be accepted as a mediator abroad, Turkey needs to solve its conflicts at home.” 13
In the age of the Arab Spring and trends of freedom which shook the region from its roots,
Turkey, with a troubled democracy and increasingly authoritarian government, will no longer
stay as a point of reference for the Arab public. In that respect, going back to old Kemaliststyle rule which excludes and oppresses minorities (Kurds, Alawites etc.) and
authoritarianism which is not tolerant to different views and opinions criticizing the
government will seriously harm perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East. While my
argument says that between 2002 and 2010 there is more or less successful democratization
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and reforms, after 2010, and especially during 2012, according to critics, there emerged an
authoritarian tendency in the government’s policies.
There is a change in Turkish foreign policy according to a research project from Fatih
University. With the help of surveys and data and the results found by TESEV and Fatih
University, we know that there is a positive change in perceptions of Turkey in neighboring
countries. However, Fatih University’s 2011 project is before the Arab Spring. This must be
taken into account. While a majority of respondents in this study answered that Turkey can be
a model for the countries in the Middle East, after the Arab Spring it is clear that demands of
democratization increased and these positive perceptions may decline. When asked what the
fundamental explanatory factor is for the positively perceived change, the highest factor
found is Turkey’s European Union accession process. It is quite apparent that this factor can
be seen as synonymous to Turkey`s democratization since Turkey made most of its
democratic reforms during this process. The second most important factor, according to
respondents is AK Party’s rise to power in 2002 at 35%, and the third is liberalization of
Turkey`s economy at 18%. 14 This tells us a lot since it demonstrates the importance of two of
this study’s independent variables: democratization and economic development.
It is possible to argue that this study is quite significant and worth considering in the
sense that soft power as defined by Nye is the easiest way to convince countries to do what
one wants and follow one’s lead. According to this thesis, if the democracy factor is the main
element explaining the soft power potential of Turkey and, therefore, just by perfecting its
democracy, Turkey can make Arab public opinion favorable, especially after the
transformations in the region called the Arab Spring, then my research is worth attention
since it shows many possible implications for Turkey’s regional power status. With the Arab
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Spring, demands for freedom and human rights are at record highs, and people are closely
following Turkey. It is interesting that, according to TESEV’s 2009 study, 15 democratic
deficit did not even appear as a problem in the region. According to the question, “In your
opinion what is the most urgent issue facing your country and the Arab world today?”
democracy was not even an answer mentioned by the respondents among others such as,
economic problems, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and terrorism.
This study will discuss the role of the other independent variables such as economy,
Islamic-oriented government, and regional activism in the third and fourth chapters together
with democratization. In the first part of the thesis, which is a case study of the period 20022010, I plan to mention and elaborate on each variable. In the second part, which is a case
study of the period from 2010-2013, I will talk more about the absence of democratization
and its consequences. Finally, in the conclusion and findings section, I will discuss what kind
of future research might arise out of this study and what consequences follow. Policy
recommendations will also be made for the government.
Many other factors might be effective in the decline of Turkey`s general perception
amongst neighboring countries in the 2012 survey by TESEV. Turkey`s ambiguous position
towards the countries of the Arab Spring and the deterioration of the relations between Iran,
Iraq and Syria might be part of the explanation. It would be too bold to say that Turkey`s
heavy handed approach towards democratization, and its recent authoritarian tendencies are
the only factors leading to this fall. However, they surely important factors which play a role
in this decline. 16
The other important aspect of this research is that Turkey`s regional perception is
likely dependent on its successful democratization. Advanced democratization can possibly
14

cause Turkey to have real regional influence where Turkey can affect policies and cause
concrete transformations in the region in favor of democracy, peace, and stability. However,
it must be noted that better perception does not necessarily mean regional influence. In other
words there must be an extra effort to achieve it since there is no direct transition between the
two. Popularity or soft power is not an end in itself, and it must give rise to something
meaningful. The absence of influence on the part of Turkey with even 100% popularity will
not help Turkey`s cause. To establish real influence Turkey needs a serious and consistent
(discourse and action) agenda of democracy promotion in the region 17, which is doomed to
be unsuccessful without legitimacy. This legitimacy surely depends on Turkey`s own
democracy.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE AND THEORY

Theoretical Approach

There will be three main theoretical approaches that I am going to use to understand
the regional perception: the Soft Power theory of Joseph Nye, the Democratic Peace Theory,
and Public Opinion Theory of John Zaller respectively.
The theories or literature on perception in International Relations cannot exactly be
applied to my research. For example there are theories borrowed from psychology explaining
the link between foreign policy and perception. They are using perception as an independent
variable to explain foreign policy. Mainstream IR theories are of limited relevance to my
research. This thesis uses a general deductive theory to explain the perception of a country
around its neighbors.
Most of the works in the literature have focused on the change in Turkish foreign
policy that allegedly occurred. The bulk of the research addresses the reasons for this change,
using mainstream IR theories such as realism, constructivism, liberalism etc. For this reason,
I believe there is a void in the study of perception. This gives rise to the uncertainty of
whether the same theories can be applied for this research as well. For example, there can be
an argument that those systemic and structural forces (as an argument of the realist theory)
affect Turkish domestic and foreign policy behavior. However we do not know if one can also
assert that those forces of the international system give rise to better regional perception of
Turkey. In fact, the dearth of research in this particular area can present a problem in
determining where to place this work among different theoretical schools.
16

Regional perception is an interesting research area, one that raises questions about
existing IR theories and looks at them from an original perspective. While it is a well-known
assertion of constructivism that ideas, values, and identities are used to explain foreign policy
behavior, can it be taken further to see if it is also useful for explaining regional perception?
Or there might be a line of thinking with the inclusion of an intervening variable which looks
like this: identities, values, and ideas ===> foreign policy activism ===> regional perception.
First of all, I would like to refer to grand foreign policy theories. The Innenpolitik
School, and Liberal Theory are in line with the arguments that I am going to make. As
Gideon Rose argued, these schools highlight the importance of domestic politics in the
explanation of foreign policy. 18 My research falls into these schools. Variables such as
democratization, economic development, Islamic oriented Government, Erdogan’s charisma
and criticism of Israel, are all domestic factors which many scholars label as the “Turkish
Model.”
Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic or liberal peace theory came to be known through the work of Michael
Doyle and is an important reference providing insight into my research. It is relevant to my
research in the sense that it explains the peace or lack of war between democracies and makes
the argument that democracies do not fight with each other, with some exceptions, and
therefore a liberal zone of peace will emerge with the increasing number of liberal
democracies. This observation is a law-like situation for some as Jack Levy argued when he
said: “This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an
empirical law in international relations.” 19 Along similar lines, Doyle argues that “Many
scholars judge that international relations are governed by perceptions of national security
and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse
17

and disrupt the pursuit of balance of power politics” 20 and also that liberalism is an “ideology
and set of institutions that has shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign relations of
political societies that range from social welfare to laissez faire.” 21 He also argues that
“Republican democratic representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human
rights and transnational interdependence could be seen as three necessary causes of the
tendencies of liberal states simultaneously to be peace prone in their relations with each other
-with a very few exceptions- and unusually war-prone in their relations with non-liberal
states.” 22
Though Doyle does not directly address the role of perception and took it as a causal
mechanism for peace, he touches on the issue of perception when he discusses the respect
that liberal countries show each other due to their representative governments. Similarly to
his argument that there are many reasons not to go to war apart from liberalism 23, I argued
that there are many reasons for a better perception of Turkey (or any other country) other than
liberalism or democratization. However, my thesis can be seen as a study of “perception” as
an intervening variable which gives way to “peace”. Hence this offers another causal
explanation to the democratic peace theory: Since they have better perceptions towards each
other, democracies do not fight. This approach can be an important contribution to the
democratic peace theory. Also relevant to my thesis is the more parsimonious and exclusive
definition of liberal democracy by Doyle. Apparently a liberal democracy has a distinct set of
principles and institutions and is not just any electoral democracy. Hence, Doyle determined
the conditions for a democratic state. I also argued in my thesis that the perception of a
democratically advanced Turkey will be positive in the Middle East. However, a regime with
a majoritarian understanding of democracy will not help Turkey's cause.
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The Theory of Soft Power
For a more specific theoretical approach, let me refer to Nye’s Soft Power Theory
which explains power as “the ability to influence the behavior of others in order to get the
outcome one wants.” There are several ways to do this: “You can coerce them with threats,
you can induce them with payments, or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you
want.” He further argues that: “power always depends on the context in which the
relationship exists.”24 He describes international politics as a three-dimensional game:
“Obtaining favorable outcomes on the bottom transnational board often requires the use of
soft power assets while the top board requires military assets and classic military solutions.” 25
Nye defines soft power as the “power of attraction” and “agenda setting.” 26 He points
out that “a country may obtain the outcome it wants in world politics because other countries
-admiring its values, emulating its example, or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness
-want to follow it.” 27 When he talks about the sources of soft power he points out that it
depends on three resources: “Its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political
values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are
seen as legitimate and having moral authority).” 28 For instance, he points to 1950s racial
segregation in the U.S to demonstrate how this policy cut its soft power in Africa 29 and
argues that domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical can undermine soft
power. 30
This theoretical perspective clearly informs my hypothesis that the democratization in
Turkey will increase its regional perception in the Middle East. As Nye argued, if Turkey can
live up to its political values at home, its soft power as an example of successful democracy
with a big Muslim population will increase. If the perception of Turkey improves, it will
become attractive to other countries. Nye`s theory also supports my other variables which
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relate to the culture and foreign policy dimensions of soft power. The variables such as
popular culture, economic development, and regional activism can be considered as
important in the improvement of Turkey’s position in the region and also in its regional
influence.
Theory of Public Opinion
The theory which most helped me to develop my arguments is Zaller's theory of public
opinion. In his book called The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Zaller talks about the
so-called marriage of political awareness and political values which together with the
information coming through mass communication and elite discourse determine public
opinion. He shows how “across a very wide range of issues, variations in the information
carried in the elite discourse, individual differences in attention to this information, and
individual differences in political values and other predispositions jointly determine the
contours of public opinion.” 31As one of the components of factors shaping public opinion he
also highlighted the role of political elites on which public perception depends. He included
“politicians, higher level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many kinds of
experts and policy specialists” as political elites. He also highlights the “effects of elite
discourse” and argues that “the shift in mass attitudes roughly coincides with the shift in elite
attitudes.” 32
Zaller further emphasized the effect of attentiveness or awareness to elite behavior or
media on public opinion and voting behavior. 33 He argued that “Understanding the effects of
elite discourse on preference formation requires modeling the effects of awareness in
mediating exposure to each of the major campaign messages in the environment, a task that
presents serious complications.” 34 This indicates how important the attentiveness of the
public is to the information given in the media or through the discourse of elites.
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He highlighted the effect of political predispositions or political values as well. He
argued that: “It is never “just information,” because it is unavoidably selective and also
enmeshed in stereotypical frames of reference.” 35 This suggests that the political values or
political frames or ideologies that people have before they hear from the media or elites also
shape public opinion.
Finally Zaller summarized his theory as follows: “Interactions among three broad
classes of variables. Aggregate level of variation in the information carried in elite discourse,
including elite cues about how new info should be evaluated, individual level differences in
attention to this discourse, and individual level differences in political values determine the
mix of “considerations” that gets into people's heads. Which of these considerations is
available at the top of the head at the moment of confronting survey questions determines the
responses to the questions.” 36
Literature
There are only a few articles written specifically on the relationship between Turkey’s
democratization and its popularity in the region. Therefore we can say that there are gaps on
this particular topic in the scholarly literature. The majority of the sources that I am going to
employ in my research will be after 2008 and particularly works written after the Arab
Spring. These pieces have touched the issue by giving sections on democratization of Turkey
and its consequences. There will be also a few older works that pointed to Turkey`s future
role in its region used in my research.
Cengiz Candar and Graham Fuller, for example, talk about Ataturk`s principle of
peace at home and abroad that could not be realized because of the conflicts and instability
inside the country for a long period. This instability started in the 1980s with a military coup
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and with rising PKK terrorism in the 1990s. The authors point to the lack of democracy and
damaged civil liberties in Turkey, as well as bad relations with almost all of its immediate
neighbors. 37 They argue that there needs to be a “resurrection of Ataturk`s concept and a new
active foreign policy for an emerging great power coupled with new domestic policies and a
harmony between them.” 38 They proposed a principle in line with this idea: “Turkey should
actively encourage the emergence of democracy as a basic principle of governance
throughout the region.” 39 They advocate this as they anticipate the broadening of Turkish
democracy itself. 40 Specifically related to my hypothesis, the authors argued that: “If Turkey
can take a few important measures to meet Kurdish aspirations (democratization by giving
Kurds their basic rights), it will emerge as a powerful and stable state.” 41
In line with the above expectation, Meliha B. Altunisik, in her article “The
Possibilities and Limits of Turkey`s Soft power in the Middle East”, argued that because of
Turkey`s internal transformations, its attractiveness has increased. She argued that Turkey`s
reform and democratization process, which accelerated after the AK Party came to power,
caused an increased interest in Turkey and its role as an example in the Arab Middle East.42
“Turkey’s reform process and the parallel progress in Turkey-EU relations have had an
impact on how Turkey is perceived in the Arab world” 43. Also the “AK Party’s coming to
power comprises an asset for the Turkish model, as it demonstrates both the evolution of the
Islamist movement in Turkey, and the potential for reconciling democracy and Islam.” 44
Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutlay, in their report on Turkey's soft power in
the Middle East, argued that: “The measurement of soft power is still problematic in the
literature, although Joseph Nye uses variables like the numbers of foreign students and
foreign visitors, and the power of the media in a country. They used the numbers of Arab
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students in Turkey, Arab citizens visiting Turkey, the power of Turkish media, and the Arab
perception toward Turkey to examine soft power.” 45 This suggests that perception and soft
power are two different phenomenon and perception is considered more under the general
umbrella of soft-power. In other words, perception is one of the factors which should be taken
into account when talking about the soft power of a country. Yet we must acknowledge that it
is still complicated to determine which phenomenon causes the other when we consider the
two. For example, it is not clearly identified in the literature whether we must consider
indicators such as foreign students studying in Turkey or powerful Turkish media as factors
affecting perception or vice versa? However, for my research purposes it is sufficient to say
that perception is a subordinate concept that might affect or be affected by soft power.
Omer Taspinar, in his comparison between Kemalist and Neo-Ottoman policies,
argued that: “In an ideal world, Ankara would address Kurdish discontent with democratic
reforms, take bold steps toward EU membership, and continue its constructive engagement
with the Middle East.” 46 According to the author, “much hinges on Turkey’s success in
becoming a more liberal democracy. A stable, Western-oriented, liberal Turkey on a clear path
toward the EU would serve as a democratic example for the rest of the Muslim world. An
authoritarian, resentful, and isolated Turkey, on the other hand, would be the opposite in
every case. If its domestic politics were to go wrong, Turkey would not only cease being a
democratic success story but also could become a destabilizing factor in the Middle East.” 47
Alper Dede, analyzed the reasons that contributed to the rise of the “Turkish Model”
in the region. Supporting almost all the variables included in this research, he argued that
“Turkey’s process of democratization, rising economic performance, Erdoğan’s popularity in
the Arab world regarding the Palestinian issue, Turkey’s gradual distancing from Israel, and
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the AK Party’s cultural-religious affinity with the people of the region in contrast to the
Kemalists and secularists in Turkey have also contributed to its attraction to people in the
Middle East.” 48
Saban Kardas, also emphasized the importance of democracy inside Turkey. He
mentioned the fact that: “Liberal commentators have argued rather persuasively that what
made Turkey a unique source of inspiration for the Arab streets was its integration into the
European and global economic and political networks and its own democratization
experience. They seek to drive home the argument that if Turkey is intent on continuing to
serve as a model or source of inspiration abroad, it has to remain committed to the path
towards deepening democratization at home, especially when it is preparing to discuss
rewriting its constitution.” 49
Losing Reform Spirit and Majoritarian Understanding of Democracy

Although not mentioning the democracy-regional influence relationship, Duncan

Mccargo and Ayse Zarakol pointed out the rise of authoritarian tendencies and the slowdown
of reforms in Turkey and tried to explain its reasons. They argued that despite many
democratic reforms, as well as coming to terms with existing Kemalist military-bureaucratic
establishment, Erdogan has recently “practiced a highly personalized form of rule.” 50
Implying the AK Party they argued: “The previously disenfranchised have been empowered
through electoral politics despite constraints imposed by the military, the bureaucracy, and the
judiciary, but they have not necessarily emerged from that process with a stronger belief in
liberal-democratic values and the hyper nationalist political-development trajectory may not
provide the most fertile ground for liberalism.” 51

24

More importantly, Zarakol in her article on problem areas for the new Turkish foreign
policy touched directly on what she called “domestic international feedback loop.” She
argued that: “Though much progress has been made, more calcified problems in Turkish
domestic policy remain unresolved, and the AK Party government, in its third term, is
showing signs of reversing some of the hard-earned gains vis-à-vis the authoritarian
tendencies of the Turkish state.” 52 All of these factors appear as “obstacles for Turkey`s plans
to wield soft power in the Middle East.” 53 She explains the reasoning as follows: “The more
Turkey acts like the old Turkey of the military-bureaucratic elite (albeit this time with an
Islamic flavor), the less likely is it to influence its region.” 54 Turkey`s source for regional
influence is its soft power rather than economic and military power. Turkey cannot compete
with Russia and the West in the region in terms of economic and military power and with
Saudi Arabia in terms of oil. 55 Like Nye, she argued that: “If Turkey is to have soft power, it
needs legitimacy first, and it cannot have legitimacy if it does not treat its own citizens
well.” 56
Finally in “Turkey and the Arab Spring,” Ziya Onis argued that despite governmental
denial, Turkey has been seen as increasingly getting away from its EU membership goals and
reforms. 57 He also argues that “although the European Union is in a state of crisis, it still has
the combination of economic and diplomatic resources to affect change in the Middle East in
a significant direction that far outweighs the resources that Turkey could marshal on its own
initiative.” 58 This could happen in the case of convergence of interests towards the Middle
East and in the case of increased standards of democracy in Turkey. 59 Furthermore he argues
that: “Developments in domestic politics and foreign policy are intrinsically interrelated. The
relevance of the Turkish experience to the rest of the Arab world will rest not only on the
depth of its economic modernization, but also on the quality of its democracy. While the AK
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Party era has been quite successful for the growth and expansion of the Turkish economy, still
major questions exist concerning the quality of its democracy. To criticize Israel and its
maltreatment of the Palestinians is perfectly legitimate. Yet for this kind of criticism to be
effective, it is important for Turkey to overcome deep divisions within its own polity and
move towards a genuinely open and pluralistic political order.” 60 By this way, I argue Turkey
could get the support of the EU both in its status as an advanced democracy and in its efforts
of democracy promotion in the region.
Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy
Since my research does not look specifically at the reasons for this foreign policy
change, I am simply going to incorporate the factors leading to Turkey’s popularity, which is
mentioned in the existing literature. It has been argued widely by many scholars that Turkey’s
popularity increased with a new brand of foreign policy recently in the Middle East. Among
the many, Perthes, argues that a change emerged in TFP with the foreign minister Ismail Cem
(1997-2002) which put some of the bases in place. Nonetheless major changes have occurred
since 2002/2003. 61 He also talks about democratization and argues that: “Turkey’s foreign
policy architects understood that in order to be considered a mediator abroad, Turkey needs to
solve its conflicts at home, and democratic initiative towards Kurdish population being an
important first step.” 62 It is certainly pertinent to my research that, in order to be deemed
positive by Arab countries, Turkey has to fix its internal problems and most importantly its
democratic deficit and issues related to human rights. The author further mentions the fact
that: “Turkey has a limited capability in bringing a change or deal in tough cases since its role
is like the EU which is preparing the ground with diplomacy and soft power but does not
involve military by giving security guarantees.” 63 He summarizes this approach as: “For the
political culture of the region, it is very important that Turkey has begun to define strength
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not in military capabilities and military power but in terms of its ability to bring about
diplomatic solutions.” 64
The Ambassador of Turkey to Lebanon, Inan Ozyildiz, also addresses this issue of
change which is regarded by some as a shift of axis. He mentions that some tried to explain
this change by political and ideological transformations of the government. However he gave
importance to the global and regional conditions that forced Turkey to play a more active role
in the Middle East. 65 What is striking about his views is how he argues that “The economic
growth, political and sociological transformation and strengthening of democracy and
democratic culture of foreign policy made Turkey more confident. Thus Turkey has built a
trust and contributed to confidence building in the region.” 66 This suggests that all of these
factors contributed to Turkey’s popularity as a country which can be trusted with its economy
and political system.
Svante Cornell, in his article “What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?” also talks about
the issue of change in Turkish Foreign Policy and its explanation. He mentioned that the
focus of AK Party changed from West to East and he evaluated the axis shift arguments. He
gave ample space to Turkey’s economic development arguing that it caused a self confidence
on the part of the Turkish government. He also talks about the role of ideology which is
“Islamist” according to him. He pointed to the Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s views which
underlie the Islamic brotherhood policy of the AK Party. 67 He clearly indicates this view as:
“The tendency of the AK Party government to side increasingly with Islamic causes, its
growing attention to non-Western powers combined with its increasing criticism of the West,
can be fully understood only if the ideological background of Turkey’s top decision-makers is
taken into account.” 68
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When Cornell talks about Arab Upheavals he highlights Turkey’s regional activism
and how “Erdogan’s hardline on Israel has indeed made him a darling of the Arab street.” 69
Also he argues that despite all the mentioned factors, “the country’s leadership has been
unable to gauge its true level of influence since this is a process which gradually takes place
and is not an immediate result of hyperactivity of foreign minister Davutoglu’s diplomacy.” 70
This also suggests in my view, neither regional activism nor a good perception of Turkey in
the Middle East will turn into regional influence necessarily. Rather it implies that Turkey
will have to harness these resources well in order to gain that “influence.” Finally he argues
that: “As the AK Party’s recent authoritarian tendency has become increasingly
acknowledged, its credibility as a force of true democratization in the Middle East has
suffered concomitantly. Also AK Party in his view has adopted a rather simplistic
understanding of democracy as a majority rule.” 71 It is striking to see how, in his view,
Turkey’s own democratic deficit causes the deterioration of its credibility and soft power in
the Middle East.
Also giving an idea of how the AK Party understood democracy, Ihsan Dagi (a wellknown IR scholar in Turkey), in his newspaper article also argued a similar view by calling it
postmodern authoritarianism. He puts it as “I don’t believe Islamists have solved their
ontological problems with democracy.” 72 By viewing democracy as a majority rule it takes
them to the understanding of an unlimited power. 73
Moreover Fareed Zakaria, in his book on illiberal democracy, also touches this issue,
by stressing the importance of reforms to have constitutional liberalism which necessitates
“rule of law, independent judiciary, liberal democracy, press freedom, and competitive
political parties, among others.” 74
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As an example of using securitization theory for the explanation of foreign policy
change, Tarik Oguzlu argued in his article “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy” that “there
is a close relationship between the degree of securitization of issues and whether the power
used to deal with them is hard or soft in nature.” 75 It automatically follows from his argument
that for example a specific foreign policy of the AK Party - i.e., zero problems with neighbors
- is actually the result of the change of mentality on the part of government elites which
involves politicization of issues. This securitization approach commonly used in the
European literature can be considered as related to constructivist approach. The author
concludes that: “These internal and external developments have contributed to Turkey’s soft
power potential.” 76 These internal and external developments, I argue, involve the
democratization and European Union accession process of Turkey, economic growth, Islamic
oriented government, and also regional activism of the AK Party government.
Soft Power/ “Turkish Model”
Importantly, Oguzlu argues that “the concept of soft power underlines the significance
of perceptions others hold vis-à-vis the agent/actor.” 77 Also, “for soft power to exist,
legitimacy/credibility is a must.” 78 This implies that Turkey must be an advanced democracy
in itself to maintain its soft power or to have it in the first place. And Turkey needs the
legitimacy and credibility first by perfecting its democracy to involve in a democracy
promotion agenda outside. Oguzlu supports this argument by saying that “Turkey’s
democratic deficit and structural fragilities at home combine to deny Turkey the capability to
play a ‘big brother’ role in Central Asia and Caucasus.” 79
Oguzlu also directs attention to the importance of the EU’s relations with the Muslim
world and thereby the significance of Turkey’s EU membership as that would imply that there
can be peace or harmony between civilizations. This understanding on the part of Turkey
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according to him has positively influenced Turkey’s soft power. 80 This has a kind of symbolic
importance which will mean a harmony of Islam and democracy. This also brings to mind the
fact that some Western countries like the U.S. supported Turkey’s EU membership and
offered Turkey as a model to emulate. A question rises as to whether this suggestion of
Turkey serving as a model can be an alternative argument with which to increase its
popularity in the region? The answer to this question is obviously “no.” The Arab public does
not think that Western countries are sincere in their effort to promote democracy in the region
since the history of Western country’s foreign policy apparently contradicts with this claim,
especially the United States’ notorious record of supporting Middle Eastern dictators
financially and militarily.
Contributing to the study of perception, Dietrich Jung looks at the reasons for
Turkey’s negative image in the Middle East. He argues that historical factors explain a lot.
Historical prejudices and stereotypes between Arabs and Turks, shaped by actions and
policies in the course of twentieth century, reinforced this negative image. 81 According to the
author: “It is this historical burden has so far prevented Turkey from playing more
successfully the role of a mediator between Europe and the Middle East.” 82 Jung’s argument
brings a different and original perspective to this current research. It makes the claim that,
aside from Turkey’s democratization and other factors outlined in this study, Arab-Turkish
history has its own role in the explanation of Turkey’s popularity. But I do not believe that
this factor has too much significance since it has become clear with the AK Party government
that with the right policies and activism, this “burden” can easily be avoided. But surely it has
merit in illustrating the negative role of the policy of the early republican regime, which was
based on forgetting the Arab Middle East.
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Further Jung analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy by using two theoretical lenses, realism
and constructivism respectively. Like Zarakol, he also argued that Turkey has limited
capability in terms of its military and economy and can only be considered as a “middle
power,” a term labeled by William Hale. 83 So it is hard to adopt a realist form of power
politics for Turkey and have it act independently with these limited capabilities. According to
Jung “therefore the state centered rationalist approach must be completed by elements of socalled constructivist theory that originates in what has been called the ‘cultural turn’ in the
social sciences.” 84 This suggests that constructivism helps to analyze foreign policy approach
of Turkish elites to the Middle East, which is not only based on strategic considerations but
also ideas and identities. This further opens the way for Turkey to pursue soft power politics
and have popularity in the end. As a source of this historically negative image, the author
mentions that “it was not the experience of centuries of Ottoman rule, but the short-sighted
and chauvinistic policies of Turkification by the Young Turks that destroyed the bonds
between Arabs and Turks and thus engendered the independence movement among Arab
nationalists.” 85 This suggests that it even predates Kemalism and may even be its inspiration.
Also these kinds of policies hurt the relations in the first place and the continuation of these
policies will reverse the current situation.
Furthermore Gamze Cavdar, looks at performance of the AK Party in Turkey, which
successfully implemented democratic reforms in the first election term, and how surprising it
is for some, since the AK Party is an Islamist party. For Cavdar, “the AK Party’s performance
in government has led some observers to argue that Turkish Islamism can be a model for
Islamists in the region.” 86 She addresses the exportability of the Turkish model to the other
countries in the Middle East and concluded that it “is unlikely to be adopted elsewhere since
it is the specific product of a transformation based on a set of distinct political and economic
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conditions.” 87 Cavdar addresses what I call the successful democratization period of Turkey
with the help of the EU accession process and swift implementation of liberalization reforms.
She explains it with the political learning process of the AK Party and argues that it was this
political learning that changed the elite’s view of how to govern. It also made them think
pragmatically and be able to make domestic and foreign adjustments. This suggests for all
these changes in foreign policy and international activism and as well as internal policy,
political learning has an important effect. 88
Cavdar asserts that: “Major developments in Turkey have been followed with
considerable interest by Arab Muslim thinkers and activists. Those who hold positive views
about the AK Party have these opinions because of the AK Party’s foreign policy, which is
perceived as independent, as well as its agenda for democratic reforms.” 89 In particular, there
are two policies that have been viewed positively: “Turkey’s objection to the U.S. war in Iraq,
and Erdogan’s characterization of Israeli incursions in Palestine as state terrorism.” 90 What is
especially significant is that Erdogan’s policies are more pronounced than those of many
Arab countries. I suggest these factors cause the admiration of Arabs. Also she argues that,
“For others, Turkish experience was worth examining because of its success in holding
reliable, open, and free elections while achieving democratic reforms and more civilian
control over the military.” 91 However, Cavdar also talks about limitations of the AK Party’s
political learning by addressing the issue of uncertainty. It is important to consider “to what
extent the AK Party’s moderation has been internalized by the whole party” 92 and whether the
AK Party is going to continue these democratic reforms as well as how committed the AK
Party is to the democratic values. 93
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This point has particular merit, if one looks at the recent discussions and arguments
about authoritarianism in Turkey. It was also indicated by a prominent columnist and
university professor in Turkey in a TV program. Mehmet Altan, argued that: “Turkey
captured a great opportunity to transform the regime. Government came so close to having a
real democracy with the policy of change developed by the AK Party. But through the years
the situation that the country found itself in has become a policy of survival of the AK Party.
The party moved away from the goal of making the welfare and freedom that Turkish people
deserve permanent as well as a radical system change.” 94 He also criticizes Erdogan as a
leader who thinks that only he can rule the country and knows best. Erdogan, he argues, is
trying to change the system in a way leads to his absolute power and serve his interests. Altan
contends that recent instability and bombings in the country is the inherent result of these
policies. 95
Finally Cavdar makes a similar point by asserting that although it is unlikely that
Turkey’s experience will be copied elsewhere, these discussions and the fact that Turkey is
now closely followed by the Arab public offers a chance for Turkish politics to advance
toward greater democracy. 96
Moreover Kadri Kaan Renda, also analyzes the change in Turkish Foreign Policy
which is observed as regional activism and an effort to get closer with Turkey’s neighbors. He
tries to explain this activism by the neo-liberal theory of Robert Keohane, which underlines
the importance of interdependence and cooperation among states. He also looks at Nye’s soft
power approach. 97 This article of Renda can be seen as representing a soft power dimension
of the TFP, which is based on economic relations and trade, as well as better neighborly
relations. The article gave ample space to Turkey’s regional activism efforts and its effects on
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Turkey’s image and credibility. 98 He points to this as: “Turkish Foreign Policy has lately
transposed to a liberal and cooperative standpoint owing to the transformation of domestic
politics through the process of democratization and the assumption of power by a new
political elite. Turkey's soft power increased and it has gained a strong foothold in regional
politics.” 99 This suggests that aside from making Turkey an inspirational example,
democratization has also caused a transformation in the TFP with regional activism and
cooperation which in turn has given rise to the regional influence.
Turkey’s Potential and Responsibility
Also an important article by Paul Salem includes all the independent variables that I
am going to use as underlying factors that contribute to a positive image of Turkey in the
Arab World. He touched on democracy, economic development, compatibility of Islam and
democracy, popular culture, the importance of Turkish TV series, and Erdogan’s alleged
charisma as well as his criticism of Israel. 100 Very importantly, Salem argues that: “The recent
Arab pro-democracy uprisings, as well as pro-democracy protests in Iran, would indicate that
Turkey’s democratic political system is an important factor behind its popularity as a model.
Also as the people of the region rebel in favor of democratic change, Turkey certainly has
even more potential - and responsibility.” 101
In contradiction with this potential and responsibility, Suat Kiniklioglu argues that:
“The dynamism behind the AK Party's drive to transform Turkey into a full democracy, to
harmonize Turkey's laws and standards with those of the EU, and to draft a new social
contract in the form of a constitution seem to have faltered.” 102 He adds that: “Conservatives
have selective understanding of democracy. They prioritize religious/conservative values over
democratic reforms. Secondly, Turkey's conservatives saw that once the regime's strongholds
were overrun, being dominant was not such a bad thing.” 103 He argues that they have a “biat”
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culture; a culture of homage/obeisance to leadership, which can also be termed as a
patrimonial political-culture. 104
Moreover Omer Caha, in his article “Turkey in the Middle East: Roles and
Perceptions,” argues that there are several reasons behind a positive perception of Turkey in
the Middle East. First of all, he relates the effect of being globally active with a proactive
foreign policy to its perception in the region. 105 Secondly, like Salem, he points to the recent
decline in Turkey's perception in the TESEV report and argues that: “It was not because
Turkey is pursuing a sectarian foreign policy but because of Turkey's policy of supporting
opposition in Syria and its negative effect on Shiite regimes and peoples in Iran, Syria, and
Iraq.” 106 He also points out that there are criticisms towards the government due to the
slowing down of negotiations with the EU. However recent polls show that: “There is a huge
public support for this policy of the AK Party as people in Turkey have a negative attitude
towards the EU.” 107 However, I argue that the shortcomings in democratization are not
justifiable since democratization in Turkey must continue even if the EU process completely
ends and it can go on independently from the EU.
Finally, Kemal Kirisci talks about a “demonstrative effect” 108 of Turkey while trying
to explain why a demand among the Arab public for the “Turkish model” emerged. He points
to the role of a trading state, democracy in progress, and a positive image of Turkey's new
foreign policy. Apparently he also touches on my research, by pointing out why there
emerged a demand for the “Turkish model.”
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CHAPTER THREE: PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY IN EGYPT

Introduction
It has been a common assumption among the scholars and literature of Turkish
Foreign Policy that a negative image of Turkey existed in the Arab World before the start of
the 21st century. However there are few surveys or opinion polls that showed a negative
perception of Turkey among the Arab public before the AK Party government came into
power in 2002.
Before analyzing the perception of Turkey in Egypt, it is helpful to provide some brief
information about the historical facts and legacies as well as the common history between the
two countries.
First of all, the historical legacies offer an alternative argument that partly explains the
perceptions of the Arab public. As discussed in the previous chapter, Jung addressed the
origins of Turkey's negative image in the Middle East and the mutually constituted
stereotypes and negative perceptions of peoples held by one another in his article. He talked
about the mutually constructed narratives, the “Terrible Turk” 109 by Arabs and the “deceitful
Arab” 110 by Turks, and also how these narratives prevented Turkey from playing an active
role in the Middle East. While acknowledging that his research (which includes talks with
elites from Egypt) cannot claim to be totally representative, he points to the arguments of
some who consider Turkey to be an instrument of Western politics. Also there is a negative
perception cast upon Kemalist Westernization project by the Arab public because it denied
Turkey's Islamic heritage. Jung explains the background of the term “terrible Turk,” which
involves violent suppression of Arab nationalism by the Ottoman state, and a tendency to
show Ottoman rule as a foreign domination, calling it either “imperialism” or “colonialism.”
36

“Barbarians” was another negative connotation cast upon the Turkish, along with the label of
“cruel

and

despotic

power

addict.”111

The Ottoman rule of the Middle East during the 19th century, according to some
scholars of late Ottoman history, resembled colonial rule since it coincided with the heavy
Westernization efforts by the Ottoman elites. 112 This caused alienation of the Arabs and also
gave rise to nationalist movements all over the empire. Especially after the Young Turk
revolution of 1908, a negative image emerged. Jung agreed, noting that “It was not the
experience of centuries of Ottoman rule but the short-sighted and chauvinistic policies of
turkification by the Young Turks that destroyed the bonds between Arabs and Turks and thus
engendered the independence movement among Arab nationalists.” 113 I acknowledge the role
of this historical burden, which goes back to Ottoman period and which was also reinforced
by the “Kemalist neglect” 114 policy of the Cold War era. I further agree that Egypt is no
exception to this historical context, and that these negative images may still constitute a part
of the predispositions of the Egyptian public about Turkey.
While it is undeniable that historical legacies have an effect on relations, I argue that
it can be dismissed currently since it is subject to change. Jung admits this by saying that the
“Constraining power of these historical legacies also has its limits.” 115 It can be argued that
after the AK Party government, a clear change in Turkish Foreign Policy emerged that
gradually destroyed this negative image. These policies included not allowing the US to use
Turkish soil in the invasion of Iraq, and harshly criticizing Israel for its actions against the
Palestinians. This argument of “historical burden” is important in the sense of acknowledging
outside factors which can continue to be present in the subconscious of certain segments of
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the Egyptian people and which is impossible to control despite the clear recent departure of
former Turkish policies.
Historical prejudices that appeared before WWI are not the only part of the negative
image of Turkey. We can observe a policy of total neglect and indifference of Turkey towards
the Middle East and Egypt, particularly during the Cold War. As argued by Aydin: “through
1945-60, Turkey's foreign policy was dominated by total Western dependence.” 116 He talks
about “Turkey's political and economic alignment with Western countries after the Second
World War because of its desire to become a fully modernized country.” 117 Putting aside
various reasons for this decision, such as the change in the structure of the international
system and the reaction to Soviet threat and pressures, Turkey chose to be an ally of the West
during most of the Cold War despite some changes in the level of alignment and dependency
with the West. As a natural outcome of this, relations with the Middle Eastern Arab countries
were an extension of Turkey's Western-dependent foreign policy and that is why the
deterioration of Turkish-Arab relations followed. Particularly: “Ataturk's reforms and general
secularization of Turkey in the name of modernization created profound resentment and
mistrust among Arabs.” 118 Turkey was seen as the pawn of the West by the Arabs during this
period, which was quite a normal reaction if we consider the fact that Turkey became the first
Islamic nation to recognize Israel and exchange ambassadors. 119
In his article, Aydin talks further about the effect of the Baghdad Pact on the negative
image of Turkey in Egypt. 120 Aside from the reasons that pushed Turkey into the arms of the
West that were mentioned above, it is also possible to talk about the role of Kemalist and
secular military-judicial bureaucracy and its approach towards the Middle East and especially
its fear of Islamization. Kemalist ideology involves the total rejection and also forgetting of
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the Ottoman Past with its culture and values, as well as its territories, since it deems
Ottomans responsible for the loss of lands, and it also saw Islam as the source of
backwardness. The image of the “deceitful Arab,” which is already discussed above, supports
this attitude of disinterest. It is possible to observe this attitude during the early Republican
era and through the early 21st century.
It is also significant to talk about the recent history of Islamic movements in Turkey
and how they evolved over time, eventually giving rise to the AK Party and its rule. In his
article, Yilmaz talks about how a partial opening of the authoritarian system in Turkey paved
the way for Turkish Islamists to take part in the democratic process and also caused a process
of learning and moderation for them. 121 He further mentions the long exclusion and closure
of Islamist parties in Turkey and the experience of AK Party founders, explaining how it
produced both caution and a change in their Islamist agenda. It is important to recall that
Erbakan, who is respected by current AK Party rulers, had to resign in 1997 with a
postmodern coup by the military, while the current premier Erdogan was imprisoned because
of a poem he recited during the same period. All these experiences, according to Yilmaz, gave
rise to the “successful change in the vision and political ideology of formerly intolerant and
exclusivist Islamists, as they became Muslim democrats. They were able to convince even
non-Muslim citizens of the country of that fact. Also, the successful transformation of the
AKP has been noted in Middle East circles.” 122
I do not agree with the term “Muslim democrats” while describing the AK Party
government in Turkey, looking at the recent developments in the country. But it is
nevertheless impossible to deny the democratic achievements of the AK Party in its initial
years and how it still serves as an example for other Muslim movements in the region, such
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as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Yilmaz highlighted the similar nature of both movements
and gives his hope that, if given similar opportunities, the MB will transform as well.123
Mentioning the history of Islamic movements in Turkey is also important because their
experiences engender an interest and expectation from the Egyptian public, who compare and
contrast these experiences and who develop a positive or negative view of Turkey by looking
at the democratic governance that exemplifies the successful harmony of Islam and
democracy.
Testing
After mentioning the factors that possibly influenced the perception of Turkey in
Egypt, we should now turn to the first two terms of AK Party rule, which I call a successful
era in terms of improvement of perception. I will look at the factors such as democratic
reforms, economic developments, Islamic oriented Government, foreign policy activism and
how these factors increased the perception of Turkey in Egypt.
2002-2010
Coming to power by taking the majority of the votes in 2002 election, the Justice and
Development Party government started a reform process which swiftly changed the statusquo and confronted the existing bureaucratic-military establishment. The reform process
accelerated with the effect of the European Union as well, for which the majority of the
Turkish public have had a positive opinion until lately. Together with the public support and
encouragement from the EU, the AK Party changed many laws and constitutional articles in
favor of democratization. This was unprecedented and not predicted by many since the AK
Party had Islamic roots and was seen as not very friendly towards democracy. It is even
considered, by some voters of the Republican Party, to be an enemy of the Republic, one with
clandestine intentions to bring Sharia to Turkey. But it seems to me, as Cavdar argued, there
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was a political learning process on the part of the elites of the AK Party who founded the
party. This political learning process occurred after they saw the dramatic closures of their
parties as incompatible with the secular principles and system of the country.
The AK Party changed the civil-military relations and reduce the role of military in
politics by referring to the EU accession process and by using the same arguments that
Kemalist secular elites used. One of these arguments is as follows: Turkey must always be
oriented towards Europe in order to reach the contemporary level of civilizations. The AK
Party government reduced the role of the military, not just in domestic politics but in foreign
policy as well, by decreasing the number of generals in the MGK (National Security
Council). This is critical, since it allowed the government to implement its own foreign policy
independently in the Middle East. This policy is mostly based on the culture, religion, and
identities that brought close relations with the regimes and countries in the Middle East.
Therefore, it can be argued that the democratization factor has an enormous importance in
bringing a positive perception of Turkey to the Middle East. It can be argued that without
those reforms, the AK Party would not be able to pursue its own policy and that regional
activism and even harsh attitude towards Israel would not have been possible. In that regard,
an ontological sense of democracy reveals much. If democracy with free and fair elections in
Turkey did not exist, parties like the AK Party, which represents the public with a huge
percentage (it took 49% of the votes in the last election), would not have come to power.
Additionally, the reforms that made radical changes in the first and second terms of the AK
Party certainly opened the way for a better regional perception of Turkey.
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Table 1 Specific Democratization Steps that Caused an Improvement in the Arab Perception
of Turkey in the time period 2002-2010
2002

Emergency rule Lifted

2003

MGK (National Security Council) reform made, military’s influence
limited, the fourth Harmonization Package including freedom of
association and deterrence against torture and mistreatment brought,
amendments enacted to the anti-terror law

2004

Constitutional amendments made for women’s rights, freedom of press and
gender Equality, state security courts abolished

2007

Democratic opening for solving the Kurdish issue initiated, improvements
in the rights of Alawites, non-Muslims, as well as other ethnic groups

2009

TRT 6 in Kurdish started broadcasting, first channel in a different language

Many articles and books argue that a positive perception of Turkey in the Middle East
skyrocketed after the AK Party came into power and during its two terms. However, my
purpose in this section is to find evidence to this argument from the Egyptian media and from
speeches of politicians, as well as scholarly work.
The reason I chose this period, especially the fact that it ended with 2010, is that it
roughly coincides with the broad uprisings which had shaken the Arab World dubbed as the
“Arab Spring.” After the year 2010, interests and demands for democracy and freedoms
boomed in the region. Also it coincides with the start of a decline of democracy in Turkey and
a trend towards authoritarianism. I am not arguing that, in the period 2002-2010, there was no
evidence of anti-democratic practices of the government or that, from 2010 to today, there
was a total drift towards authoritarianism. Rather, I argue that the gravity or weight from
2002-2010 was more towards democratic improvement and that, from 2010 onwards, there
was less democratic improvement or more authoritarian practices. And the perceptions
respectively were more positive in 2002-2010 and more negative from 2010 onwards in terms
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of gravity. There was a gradual increase in the perception from 2002 onwards. Apparently, it
is not a hypothesis of this paper that between 2002-2010 perceptions were high at all times.
In this chapter I will have an opportunity to test my hypotheses that the perception of
Turkey was generally positive in the first term and negative in the latter. Understandably, as
argued in this paper, many other factors affected perception of Turkey in the Middle East
during this period, including the ones that I took as my independent variables, and as general
parameters that determine perception. But, in particular, my aim is to test the effect of
democratization in Turkey.
Azzam points to the relations between Turkey and Egypt and mentions the close ties
that have been forged between the post-revolutionary Morsi government and Turkey. The
author also mentions how Turkey has supported Egypt financially and has been a supporter of
the Arab Spring as well as the importance of the shared historical ties between the two
countries. 124 This suggests that it is needless to say how Turkey's own democratic
achievements, and its general image, matter in the eyes of the Egyptian public. According to
Azzam, “The presidency has looked at examples across the world for inspiration and
direction.” 125 Also it is important to emphasize how the perception of Turkey matters (if
Morsi is looking for inspiration and direction 126) for Egypt's own democratic trajectory, since
if the Egyptians perceive a celebrated democratic example in Turkey, they might move to a
similar direction. Azzam also highlights the vitality of this issue for Egypt by arguing that:
“The consolidation of the democratic process needs to continue.” 127
First of all, in the literature Uysal pointed to older studies on the perception of Turkey
and mentioned Bayumi (1989) and Dakuki (2001). 128 He argued that both studies are
outdated because important developments happened since, such as 9/11, the invasion of Iraq
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in 2003, and the AKP's rise to power in Turkey. 129 Also, although he is one of the pioneers in
the literature concerning the perception of Turkey, Uysal focused solely on Egypt to measure
the perception of Turkey. He gave his reasoning by pointing to the central place and
importance of Egypt in the Middle East, arguing that it can be representative and reflective of
the opinion in the region. However, I believe that in order to better test the perception, we
need to look at multiple case studies in the region. By looking at multiple cases I will
sacrifice precision in order to have a broader comprehension. For example, I will analyze the
role of the Islamic-oriented government and will focus on the active foreign policy of Turkey
as two general parameters. Also, over the last three years there have been many developments
in the region which might have affected perception of Turkey, such as the Gezi Park events in
Turkey and the military coup in Egypt.
Opinions on “Turkish Model” or Experience
First of all, the momentous 2002 elections, which brought the AK Party into power in
Turkey, can be considered a significant development. The democratic election of an Islamicoriented party attracted great attention to Turkey as well as boosted its perception in the
Middle East. This is agreed by Uysal, who highlighted the secular nature of Turkey. 130 He
further notes that, according to the El Misr el Yevm (which is considered an independent
newspaper) columnist Eymen El Cundi, Erdogan made Turkey a brand new country.
Improvements in the areas such as the economy and human rights, as well as Turkey's
struggle for regional stability collectively created a positive perception. Erdogan is
consequently considered a leader who is trying to carry out Islamic brotherhood in the region.
Also, it is argued that, thanks to Erdogan's charisma and experience, a “Turkish Model”
emerged in the region. 131 While also accepting the negative connotations in the eyes of Arab
people (because of the Greater Middle East Initiative, and relative anti-Americanism in the
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region after the Iraq War), after 9/11 it is widely known that Turkey was put forward as a
model for the other countries in the region by the Bush administration, who declared war
against extremism. Turkey must be considered by the West as a good example, with its
secular system and electoral democracy, for other Muslim countries to copy. This, I argue,
attracted great attention to Turkey and caused a positive perception in general.
Another factor that made Turkey significant according to Uysal is its new and more
dynamic opening to the Middle East. The emergence of Turkey as being an important power
in the region with its active foreign policy based on zero-problems with neighbors revived the
Neo-Ottomanist debates and this role was perceived positively by the Arabs in general. 132
Moreover, according to El-Gad (newspaper belonging to the Opposition party that
started the Kifayeh movement for the democratization of the regime in Egypt), Turkey is a
good model for the Arabs who try to solve their economic and political problems. This is
especially important in light of the discussions of moderation among Islamic parties and the
making of peace with the secular regime, and the regime's tolerance to the Islamic parties.
Also, Turkey's more independent foreign policy is appreciated among the Arab left, which
has a dominant nationalist and anti-West discourse. In particular, the implementation of legal
reforms towards basic rights and freedoms desired by the Arab left and the progress in
fighting against poverty was admired. It is further argued that when it is time to show an
example for the democratic rights and freedoms in the Arab and Islamic World today, the
Turkish Model pointed first. 133
Also, Islamists in the Arab World and Egypt have gotten closer to the AK Party and
see it as a model since the founders of AK Party originated in “Milli Gorus,” which is
considered an Islamic movement. However, seculars were more wary of the AK Party. 134 This
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is consistent with my hypotheses that a better perception of Turkey emerged because of an
Islamic-oriented government, though not very much among seculars. I believe this was the
case for the majority of the Egyptian public, as reflected in the opinion polls.135 However
there are of course others who might have negative views of Turkey's Islamic AK Party,
which was pointed by Uysal that a “Secular opposition party of Egypt El-Gad argued that
Islamic model in Turkey is not yet complete and still in the process of evolving.” 136
Also, it has been highlighted by Uysal where he cited Celal El-Azm that before the
AK Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, or in general, the Arab Right's view of Turkey was
negative due to the fact that the Caliphate was removed in the new Turkey. It was also
because of the harsh Kemalist secular policies, which included a strict Westernization project
as well as close relations with Israel. Nevertheless, after they saw how the AK Party
successfully incorporated its Islamic background into a secular democratic structure
peacefully (without sacrificing its independence in foreign policy with actions that clearly
contradict Western interests, including harsh criticism of Israel), they were greatly inspired by
it and changed their slogans. 137 This is reflective of the MB's positive image of Turkey. Also,
as a political elite view which certainly affects the perceptions of a large percent of Egypt's
population, the MB's point of view must be taken into account.
Another widespread positive view given by Egyptian media and intellectuals in this
period is that Turkey's success lay in its fusion of Islam and democracy. 138 And more
importantly, for some Turkey is the only country that can balance Islam and Secularism. 139
Also secular and nationalist party El-Vefd's newspaper compared Turkey and Egypt,
arguing that while Egypt was exposed to poverty, bad governance, and corruption, Turkey
attracted attention with its developments in economic and political fields. The Turkish model
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has been mentioned in Egypt with Turkish democracy, secularism, foreign policy, economics,
diplomacy, as well as a moderate Islamic government. Furthermore El-Vefd's leading article
reveals a surprise and envy towards the “Turkish model,” with a radical change from 1980's
military coup (which brought so many obstacles to freedom of speech) to a democratic
country ruled by a party with Islamic roots and increased regional-international influence and
economic development. Most importantly the success of the AK Party with democratic
rhetoric instead of an Islamic one resonated in Egypt. 140
“Erdogan Factor”
When I ask Middle Eastern people their opinion about Turkey in my conversions,
most of them mentioned Erdogan and how charismatic and successful he is and how he has
provided development and prosperity to his country. This factor which I call the “Erdogan
factor” or “Erdogan's charisma” reveals a lot in terms of Turkey’s image in the region, and I
can say that it is still effective.
Heper analyzed Erdogan as a leader in his article and talked about “Erdogan's
contribution” (which he also defined as reconciling tradition and modernity) 141 as putting “an
end to the undue influence of the military and the judiciary in politics.” 142 These actions of
Erdogan in the first two terms of his government are very critical in the sense that it led to a
better perception of Turkey in the region. It is very significant and relevant especially when
we consider the military takeover of the Morsi government in Egypt recently. The issue of the
military's involvement in politics in the Islamic World is widespread and the success of a
Muslim majority country in this issue clearly is a good example for the others and it has
arguably improved the perception of Turkey.
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Uysal's piece, which basically looks at the period until 2010, conforms to my
hypotheses that the perception of Turkey was generally positive until 2010. His findings say
that, in general, Turkey emerged as a model country in Egypt during this period. His
reasoning for this is as follows: “Progress towards democracy in Turkey in recent years,
cultural, political and economic openings to the Arab countries, support of Ankara to the
Palestinian cause, and developing economic relations with Egypt.” 143 He also argues that
primary reason why the “Turkish Model” attracted attention in Egypt is the active and
multifaceted foreign policy of Turkey. 144 It goes without saying that starting with the refusal
of joining and helping in the invasion of Iraq, actions and incidents such as mediation efforts
between Israel and Syria, the Davos crisis, Mavi Marmara, and the role played with Brazil in
the Iranian nuclear crisis have had clear results towards the end of positive image.
Another indicator or a way of measuring perception of Turkey in the Middle East and
Egypt is to look at the number of people coming to Turkey between the years 2002-2010.A
table 145 in the Dincer and Kutlay piece shows that: “While the number of visitors coming
from the Middle East was 975 thousand in 2002; it exceeded 3.6 million in 2010.” 146
Especially in the countries Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, there is a tremendous increase.
Also in Egypt if we look at the numbers in 2002 the total number of citizens coming to
Turkey was 21,583 and then in 2010 it became 61,560, which show a clear rise. 147 It shows
that during these years Turkey became a favorable tourist destination which implies an
improving perception of Turkey, of which Egypt is no exception.
As an interesting argument and similar to mine, some scholars also have pointed to
the role of Turkish media like “Arabic-broadcasting TV channels(TRT Arabic), print media,
and show business (television series and movies) as a component of soft-power.” 148
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While all these important developments happening in Turkey between 2002 and 2010,
beyond assumptions and my particular hypothesis, it is critical to look at Egypt and see how
Egyptian and Arab media reflected Turkey. It is also important to look at how political elites
talked about Turkey as well as how people perceived Prime Minister Erdogan.
The theory of Zaller, which I talked about in the theory section, is a combination of
people's predispositions, political elite discourse, and the information provided by the Media.
The opinion of Egyptian political elites (politicians, journalists, academics, intellectuals,
writers) is as clearly observed in the Uysal (2010) piece, was generally positive as reflected
by (El-Baradai, Kifayeh Movement, El-Vefd Party, Arab Nationalists as well as MB). The
image reflected in the Egyptian media about Turkey was also generally positive. Finally the
public predispositions (as a product of historical legacies) toward Turkey during the start of
the period which I call successful were negative. However, I argue that with a positive change
in the policies of the AK Party government, which includes active engagement with the
region and its Islamically-sensitive approach, these negative feelings or perceptions also
gradually vanished. Then, I argue that overall we have a combination of Turkey’s image,
which I find out to be positive as an outcome of all these factors. The public predispositions
was the only negative factor which was particularly dominant during the first few years of the
AK Party government but it entered to a trend of decline after the positive developments in
Turkey and the way in which it was handled in the Egyptian media and by the political elites.
2010-2013
While in 2009 and 2010, favorable opinion of Turkey in the Middle East in general
was 75 and 85 percent respectively; in 2011 it decreased to 78 percent. Then it declined to 69
percent in 2012 according to TESEV's report. 149
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Consistent with my hypothesis, there are some scholars of Turkish foreign and domestic
policy arguing that there is a decline in Turkish democracy in the recent years of AK Party
government. Onis, for example, mentioned arguments that claimed: “A “civilian tutelage” has
replaced “military tutelage” of the Kemalist era, and the later phase of the AK Party era is a
kind of a limited or majoritarian understanding of democracy with new elements of exclusion
built into the democratic system.” 150 It was further argued that: “This has manifested itself in
terms of controls over the press and freedom of expression, the lack of tolerance for
opposition, and the notorious malfunctioning of the judicial system.” 151
Onis also talks about the AK Party's loss of reform momentum, and he tries to explain
its reasons. He looks at Turkey's democratization process in 1999-2010 and compares its
achievements and limitations. As limitations, he argues that: “The dominance of the ruling
party limits the space available for genuine pluralism.” 152 Also because of this dominance
recent “Kurdish opening” plunged into deadlock. 153 This dominance, the author adds: “Raises
concerns about creeping authoritarianism of the government, as domestic politics turn into a
more conflict driven and antagonized sphere and elements of continued polarization also
attempt to side-track the ongoing constitutional process towards the institutionalization of a
presidential system with weak checks and balances.” 154 With the help of Onis, I created my
own table to show these trends (see Table 2 below). These discussions of the presidential
system obviously show intent on the government's part to change the current system, which,
according to Onis, would “help to enhance executive power at the expense of the legislature
and the judiciary. This in turn, would be hardly conducive to the process of democratic
consolidation and deepening in the Turkish context.” 155
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Table 2 Decline in the Democratization Process Which Caused a Negative Perception among
Arab Public in the time period 2010-2013
Government’s spirit and enthusiasm for reforms waned
Dominance of the ruling AK Party and the weakness of the opposition
Restrictions over the freedom of expression, and fairness of the judicial process
The pressure over judiciary and media tended to increase
Jailed journalists, fired dissenting columnists, showing signs of creeping authoritarianism
Discussions of presidential system and plans to bring it to Turkey show signs of
increasing the power of executive with weak checks and balances on the side of the
government

Erdogan does not tolerate criticism of any kind, according to Heper: “In recent years
certain media owners have had to pay enormous amounts of taxes; some argued that these
taxes represented a penalty for outspoken critics of Erdogan in the media. This indirect
censure of the media has even led to certain journalists losing their jobs.” 156 Also when
looking at Erdogan's life, Heper argues that he “has a basic respect for democracy.” 157 He
continues, adding that “He has not been equally accommodating to the Alawites in Turkey,
who have requested that their temples (cemevleri) should be given the same legal status as
that of the mosques and similarly granted state funds. On this issue Erdogan has stated that
Alawiism is not a religion separate from Islam.” 158 He also points that “Both Erdogan's belief
that the goal of democracy is that of finding Allah's consent (riza) regarding what is ‘just’ and
‘unjust’ and his related ideal of communalized piety may not bode well for democracy.” 159
Turkey's active foreign policy also involves a democracy promotion agenda. It is so
important that Ankara even sacrificed her vital national interests in Syria by urging Assad to
step down. As an example of this policy, in a long interview with the Cairo Review, Turkish
Foreign Minister Davutoglu “urged Egypt to write an inclusive constitution with liberal and
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minority protections.” 160 While we acknowledge that promotion of democracy and
democratic values in the Middle East will be welcomed by the Egyptian Arab public who
started the protests in 2010 and the perception of Turkey will be generally better, the
deterioration of democracy inside Turkey will put the image in danger especially when Arab
people see that Turkey lacks the liberal democracy which it eagerly advertises in the region.
While mentioning the positive developments in Turkey with the AK Party in power,
its success and how it contained the role of the military as well as Turkey's economic
improvements, well-known Palestinian journalist Al-Atwan (2013) also argues that “recently,
Erdogan has started to implement Islamic measures, with a ban on the sale of alcohol recently
rushed through parliament. Restrictions of the media and freedom of expression have also
increased.” 161
Public opinion
Perfectly aligned and appropriate with my research, Zaller argues that public opinion
is shaped by the interaction between information and predispositions. It is clear that the way
to get information is through the media and political elites.
It is naïve to expect the ordinary public to have detailed -- or any -- information about
political issues. This suggests that when we say public opinion, we actually mean political
elites, because the opinion of the public is shaped by these elites. In my case, most of the
people in the Middle East do not have much information about Turkey's economy,
government ideology, or democracy. Usually political elites like politicians, journalists, and
activists, follow Turkey and have these ideas. Of course we cannot rule out some interested
and knowledgeable members of the public as well. These ordinary citizens reach their
opinion as a result of what they hear from these elites and also by their own predispositions.
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So it is very crucial to appreciate the role of elites who shape public opinion. At the start of
this research, I assumed that if we take into account the “Arab Spring” and democratic trends
in the Middle East, in the long term these elites will be mostly pro-democracy. This suggests
that pro-democracy elites who closely follow the developments in Turkey, which they see as
a model or at least as an inspiring example, will have positive perceptions about a democratic
Turkey. Contrarily, they will have negative feelings and attitudes towards Turkey if Turkey's
democracy deteriorates in the future.
With the widespread events like Taksim Gezi Park 162 in Istanbul and violent police
crackdown, together with images that lend the appearance that there is another Turkish spring
emerging because of government suppression and crackdown on dissent, one can argue that,
with the international media coverage towards those sorts of events, especially through
networks like Aljazeera which are well-received in the Middle East, the image of Turkey as a
country that projected itself as a democracy and as an example for the burgeoning
democracies in the region will worsen. It is normal that the masses that watch TV will get a
negative image of Turkey when they see violent protests in the streets. Then the positive
image of Turkey in their minds, which previously evoked notions of a peaceful harmony of
Islam and democracy, will change. The fact that even the brutal Assad regime in Syria
ironically criticized Erdogan to listen to people's demands damaged Turkey's image in the
region.
All the criticisms and evidence, which I mentioned above from books and articles,
point to a trend towards authoritarianism in the period after 2010. From 2010 onwards the
perception on the part of Egyptian elites and the image displayed by the media started to
worsen.
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Examples from the Media
Prominent journalist and longtime editor-in-chief of the London based newspaper AlQuds al-Arabi, Bari Al-Atwan also displays the declining perception in his article: “Erdogan's
Turkey has until now been the template for coexistence; seeing moderate Islam and
democracy flourish side by side. It also presented a role model for economic reforms which
have seen the average income of a Turkish citizen rise to more than $13,000 a year, a fourfold increase in less than ten years. These achievements are at risk if the present unrest
(meaning Gezi Park events) is not dealt with by dialogue, wisdom, and restraint from using
security solutions and violence.” 163
Abdulrahman al Rashed, who is the general manager of the Al-Arabiya newspaper,
argued that protests in Taksim square in Istanbul attracted great attention. He admits that it is
not like the situation in Tahrir square or the revolution in Tunisia. He also maintains that
Turkey is not Egypt or Syria. However, the attention given was the same as the other
countries and it was as if a Turkish spring was underway. 164 He says that: “An Egyptian
hopes that Erdogan falls, while Syria's information minister mockingly advised Erdogan.”165
On the one hand he pointed to Erdogan's legitimacy and his election successes. On the other
hand, he argued that: “Erdogan does not completely adhere to the rules of democratic work
like Britain’s premier or Germany’s chancellor do. He jailed journalists, pursued competing
media outlets and attempted to restrict people’s freedoms. Perhaps this is what led his rivals
to gather against him in Taksim Square under the excuse of rejecting to uproot trees.” 166 This
clearly suggests that the Egyptian and Arab media in general followed the situation in Turkey
(by which I mean the anti-democratic trend), and they reflected it to the Arab public. This in
turn caused a declined perception.
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Before the “Arab Spring,” I read much news about Egypt that shows that Egyptian
leadership does not approve of Turkish policies and criticizes the Turkish government. This is
the case, even when the perceptions about Turkey skyrocketed in general in the Arab World
and especially when Egyptian public opinion of Turkey was also at its top according to the
surveys. It was quite normal for the Egyptian regime to criticize Turkey for inspiring Islamist
movements inside Egypt. It might also be normal for the regime to not like Turkey as a
democratic country and for many other reasons and motives such as strategic or ideological
reasons, or as a rival/opponent for regional influence. While speeches of politicians also
manipulate or lead some segments of the population, usually its real radius is limited in
authoritarian countries. Still, I will provide some examples of speeches of leaders.
As I will discuss more in detail in the Tunisian case, the foreign policy factor was also
very effective in the explanation of the declining perception of Turkey in the Middle East in
2010-2013 period. In Egypt, after the coup which ousted President Muhammed Morsi,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and the AK Party decided to take sides and support the
Muslim Brotherhood. I argue that this is a foreign-policy mistake and instead Turkey and the
prime minister should have emphasized the reestablishment of democracy in Egypt as soon as
possible. This preference on the part of the Turkish government in turn negatively affected
perception of Turkey among the broad segments of the Egyptian society. This also appeared
in the Tunisian media:
“Turkey has emerged as one of the fiercest international critics of what it has called an
“unacceptable coup” after the military toppled Mursi last month. Erdogan’s peculiar attitudes
toward the events in Egypt urged many Egyptian TV channels to launch a boycott on Turkish
drama series to express their refusal of the Turkish Prime Minister’s stance and to protest against
his interference in the Egyptian affairs. A number of TV channels, including Al-Hayat, Al-Nahar,
and Al-Kahera Wal Nas, responded to the call by boycotting Turkish series. Al-Hayat TV
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channel informed its viewers that starting Saturday there will not be any Turkish drama TV
series due to Erdogan’s stance. Many Egyptian Journalists, actors, writers and filmmakers
appreciated the call for the boycott and welcomed the idea of stopping the airing of Turkish TV
soaps, which are widely popular in the Arabic world. Al Hayat TV owner stated in an interview
with Al-Arabia channel that he decries Turkey’s intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs,
describing Ankara’s position on the situation as “narrow minded.” He highlighted how the soaps
have helped Turkey lure more tourists from Egypt and the region, foreseeing that the boycott will
result in “huge losses” for Turkey.”

Mona Eltahawy,

an
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influential Egyptian-American journalist and political

commentator, shared a post in her twitter account: “Solidarity with Turkey protestors
bec[ause] I support the right to protest everywhere and I oppose police brutality
everywhere.” 168 She also shared the famous hashtag #occupygezi which shows her clear
support to the protestors. I also argue that views of intellectuals and journalists like her give a
negative image of Turkey and greatly affect the public opinion in Egypt.
Finally in Al-Ahram weekly an article by Sayeed Abdel Maguid appeared with the
title: “Erdogan Ignores Fresh Protests.” In the article Maguid draws attention to the protests
that happened again in Turkey two months after the Gezi protests. The author argued that:
“Turkey’s Erdogan blusters on in blind ignorance that public dissent in the country could be
based on real grievances.” 169 He continued, noting that:
“Turkey is once again haunted by the same turmoil that engulfed it in May. But this
time the protests are focused in the Hatay region on the borders with Syria. Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still in denial about it all. For him, the disturbances are but abnormal
occurrences, having nothing to do with how the majority of the population feels. He even
threatened those who “attempt to sow disorder,” without admitting the veracity of the underlying
grievances. Many were incensed when Erdogan, instead of tackling the mounting discontent at
home, developed an obsession with hosting the 2020 Olympics. The Turkish minister for EU
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affairs, Egemen Bagis, even warned demonstrators that, “If Istanbul loses; it will be your
fault.””
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He also pointed to the foreign policy failures of the government as: “Meanwhile,
Erdogan’s policy on Syria bombed and his support for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood bordered
on the embarrassing.” 171 Abdel Maguid clearly did not draw a positive picture of Turkey and
indicated the signs that the Arab public opinion of Turkey is declining because of the Turkish
Government's recent policies.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY IN TUNISIA
There are a lot of similarities between Tunisia and Turkey. First of all, there are
cultural similarities and a common history between the two countries. Tunisia was ruled by
the Ottoman Empire for centuries along with the other countries in the Maghreb and stayed
under its rule until the beginning of French colonialism in 1881. Also, one could argue that
debates about the Turkish model of government started earlier with the first President of
Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba. Bourguiba took secular Turkey as a model and envied Ataturk (the
founder of modern Turkey) very much. He followed a similar path to Ataturk in terms of
modernizing the country and passing reforms. Bourguiba made many reforms in regards to
women's rights, family planning, education, economy, and other issues. He tried to reduce the
role of Islam in the country, much like Ataturk. For a long time, headscarves were banned in
Tunisia at schools and public places, similarly to Turkey.
I am referencing Zaller’s theory and indirectly applying it in this study. I felt the need
to make some modifications in my research. For example, unlike with Egypt, I prefer not to
give much space to the politicians and leader's perception and speeches about Turkey. There
is likely a huge discrepancy between public opinion and policy-makers in the Arab World
since the majority of these regimes rule arbitrarily, thus inhibiting political representations of
the populace. This creates situations unlike an average Western democracy. Zaller's theory
might be a perfect fit for Western liberal democracies, but probably not for Middle Eastern
autocracies. In a functioning democracy, the elected officials are deemed as legitimate, and,
thus, their views/discourse can affect and represent public opinion. However, in a Middle
Eastern dictatorship, why would people care about and shape their opinion according to the
views of a leader that they did not vote for? Of course we cannot neglect the ruler's coalition
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of interest, made up of select individuals who care about what the leader has to say, but this
constitutes a very limited percentage of the population.
In Tunisia currently, a democratically elected government has been ruling the country
for only around two years. Before, the country's history was full of unaccountable leaders. It
is therefore normal for Arab decision-makers, in authoritarian states, to criticize Turkey for
political and strategic reasons, rather than because of public opinion. For this reason, the
views of other political elites (journalists, academics, etc.) were considered more than those
of politicians. The views of influential writers, academicians, journalists, intellectuals etc. are
more reflective of public opinion when a dictator is ruling the country. For example, in
Tunisia, when he was still in power, Zein el Abidin Ben Ali could criticize Turkey just
because he perceived the success of Turkish Islamists as a threat since it might encourage
Tunisian Islamists as well. Likewise, in Egypt, the Mubarak regime criticized Turkey for
strategic reasons such as perceiving Turkey as a rival for regional influence and power as
well as for the same reasons as Ben Ali. By the same reasoning, one can argue that the media,
including newspapers, will also reflect the government’s position since they are under the
control of the regime. However, I argue that it is not logical for dictators to apply pressure to
newspapers and writers just because they praise Turkey and its achievements unless they are
critical of their own government and its actions. Thus, I suggest it is safe to focus on
newspapers and columnists to examine perceptions of Turkey.
As previously pointed out, I use perception of Turkey as a general term denoting
perceptions of foreign policy, domestic politics, and as a country in general. Mustafa Ellabad
describes this by saying that perception is, “Standing in the world, region” 172.
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Testing
To make this case study as representative as possible, I took views from sources with
different political predispositions and from various segments of society in Tunis. I examined
the views of Leftists, Islamists, secularists, and Salafists, etc., especially elites, who are
respected in society. I will do qualitative and interpretive analysis to understand the
perception expressed in these statements.
2002-2010
An initial observation is that Arab opinion towards Turkey in 2002 was generally
negative. According to a poll measuring Arab opinion of thirteen countries, “Turkey also did
quite poorly, receiving only slightly net positive ratings in two of the eight countries
surveyed.” 173 The most favorable opinion of Turkey was in Morocco with 52% and the least
favorable was in in UAE with 11%. 174
Similarly to perceptions in other Middle Eastern countries, the perception of Turkey in
Tunisia in the 20th century was generally negative because of the aforementioned reasons
such as Turkey's alignment with the West and the image of Turkey as the servant of Western
interests in the Middle East. However, with the AK Party’s rise to power and the active
engagement of Turkey in the region both economically and politically, perceptions began to
become more positive throughout the Middle East. Tunisia is no exception. According to the
Ministry of Economy, 175 while the foreign trade volume between Tunisia and Turkey in 2005
was $387 million, it increased to $1.1 billion in 2008. Turkey's own economic development
during the AK Party’s rule was also a great factor in creating more positive perceptions of
Turkey in Tunisia.
As an example of the official rhetoric about Turkey in Tunisia in the Ben Ali era,
Ghazi Jomaa, the Tunisian Ambassador to Turkey in 2008, did not say anything about the
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Turkish Model or Turkey's democratic improvements, and about whether these could offer an
example for Tunisia. Instead he highlighted factors such as economic relations and increasing
trade between the two countries 176. Nonetheless, Turkey's soft power was on the rise at that
time. Sami Orhan, the host of Ayna (Turkish TV travel program) pointed to this positive
perception of Turkey in 2008:
“You get a real sense of the affection Tunisians have for Turks when you stroll through the open
markets here. People repeat the phrases and words they know in Turkish for you as you pass
through. They tell us, “Türkiye kardeş ülke” (“Turkey is a sibling country”). Many of the
merchants here tell us of past trips they have made to Turkey. As we pass through the
marketplace, we are invited into many shops. We hear the word “arkadaş” or “friend” repeated
everywhere we go, and people count the names of Turkish soccer players they know. They tell us
how happy they are that Turkey is heading toward European Union membership. As we learn,
traveling from here to visit Turkey is a major trend, especially for those involved in international
trade.” 177

As previously indicated in the Egypt case, another example of increased positive
perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the rise in the
number of tourists. According to Turkish tourism agencies, “the number of tourists from the
Middle East and North Africa to Turkey is increasing, and they said the number of tourists
from that area to Turkey was up between 20 and 50% in the first six months of 2009. Around
10,600,000 tourists visited Turkey in the first half of 2009. The number of tourists from
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, United Arab Emirates,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan was up in the mentioned period.” 178 This increase also
coincides with the rising popularity of Turkey and Erdogan in the Middle East due to the
Turkish government’s active foreign policy and other actions giving the impression of Turkey
as a regional super power.
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Opinions on the “Turkish Model” or Experience
In light of these factors, it is also possible to talk about the influence of the “Turkish
Model” on the “Arab Spring” and the revolution in Tunisia. Many scholars 179 have previously
pointed to the role of Turkey in this sense. In the 2002-2010 period, Turkey showed that a
Muslim country can be democratic and remain secular. This period also showed how a
democratically elected government representing the people's voice achieved an economic
success and maintained active engagement in the region as a rising power. This rise follows
the trajectory of the Turkish people's values and concerns. These developments in Turkey
definitely inspired the Tunisian youths who were oppressed under a dictator and who were
deprived of freedom of expression under terrible economic conditions.
“Returning to Tunisia after nearly 20 years in exile, Ennahda’s leader Rachid Ghannouchi
declared that he had taken Turkey’s AK Party as a model; also Ahmed Najib Chebbi, founder of
the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, argued that Tunisia should embrace democracy in
Turkey as a model. There is a historical sympathy for Turkey in Tunisia, Chebbi says, stressing
that the previous decade’s developments in Turkey have also been closely followed in his
country. “Today, there is a phenomenon in Turkey that increases our sympathy for this country:
The participatory democracy model that is being successfully implemented by moderate Islamic
politicians in Turkey. We are closely following the policies of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan
who has united Muslim culture with Western-oriented democratic culture,” said Chebbi, while
declaring that Tunisians had taken the democratic struggle in Turkey as a model. “Turkey has
economically made a huge jump and gained a huge prestige within its own region. In the past,
Arab countries have been skeptical towards Turkey since its image was being a country that is
affiliated with the policies of the United States and Israel. Today, Turkey has found its place, and
Arabs are very glad to see Turkey coming back,” Chebbi elaborated, stressing that Turkey’s firm
stance and support in the Palestinian cause had totally changed Arabs’ perception of Turkey.”

180

Also, “Yadh Ben Achour, a prominent lawyer who is the head of Tunisia’s Higher
Political Reform Commission, underlined that in Turkey, Erdoğan has shown that a person
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who originates from an Islamic wing can reconcile Muslims with a democratic and secular
regime. Erdoğan’s rising popularity among people in recent years is the reason behind
politicians’ intense interest in Turkey” 181. These remarks show how positive the political
elite's perceptions of Turkey were in the 2002-2010 era. This positive perception is the
outcome of Turkey's economic development and active foreign policy with Muslim
sensitivities as the reflection of Turkey's conservative electorate. Most significantly, it is also
the outcome of Turkey's combination of Islam and democracy in a harmonious way.
Perceptions will be less positive if Turkey loses that virtue.
Moreover a leftist and longtime exile interim president of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki,
in his visit to Turkey, told the reporters that: “The Turkish experience of developing its
democracy is a good example for his country and added that Tunisia will follow the same
path that Turkey did.” 182 It is striking that he says “the Turkish experience” instead of
“model,” and he stresses the democratization part of this experience the most alongside other
factors such as the Turkish economy.
2010-2013
This section will discuss the argument that there is a gradual decrease in positive
perception of Turkey starting from 2010 to the present. Favorable opinions of Turkey in
Tunisia dropped from 91 percent in 2011 to 80 percent in 2012 according to TESEV's
survey183. This is evidence of a declining trend in positive perceptions of Turkey in Tunisia.
There are two critical junctures that put the perceptions of Turkey to a litmus test in the
Middle East. These are: 1) the Arab Spring and Turkey's reaction to it and 2) the Gezi Park
events.
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First, some background about Tunisia and the region will help illuminate the
discussion in this section. According to Pew Global Attitudes: “As conditions have
deteriorated, Tunisians’ faith in democracy has weakened over the past year. Nonetheless,
broad majorities still prioritize key democratic principles and institutions.” 184 This is
consistent with my assumption that interest in democracy in the Middle East, including
Tunisia, has increased after the Arab Spring. Another poll by Pew Research also illustrates
this issue:
“In 2012, When asked which is a better model for the role of religion in Tunisia’s
government – Turkey or Saudi Arabia – the majority named the more secular Turkey as the ideal,
while just 18% chose Saudi Arabia. Sixty three percent said Turkey is a better model. While the
majority still sees Turkey as a model, the percentage of respondents with this opinion has
dropped from the higher levels before 2010. Also, most of those surveyed believe Turkey favors
democracy in the Middle East, including roughly three-in-four in the newly democratic nations
of Egypt and Tunisia. In Tunisia 74% and in Egypt 78% considered Turkey as favoring
democracy in the Middle East.”
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This reflects the agenda of democracy promotion in Turkish foreign policy, especially
after the Arab Spring. However, this could have negative consequences if Turkey's
democracy at home worsens. This would be a clear contradiction and will give signs of lack
of sincerity in Turkish democracy.
In a different survey conducted in the spring of 2013 called “How Middle Eastern
Elites Perceive Turkish Foreign Policy”, when respondents were asked if Turkey's
democratization experience can be a source for inspiration for the Middle East 67% of
Tunisians said yes in contrast to 33% who answered no. Still, these indicators signal a decline
in the perception of Turkey compared to previous years like 2009 and 2010 when Turkey was
considered by many (higher than 80% of respondents) as a model. 186 There are also other
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questions showing bad signs for Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) in this survey. For example,
43% of Tunisians agreed that Turkey is pursuing foreign policy goals that exceed her
economic and military power and capabilities. In addition, close to 60% in general in the
Middle East and more than 50% of Tunisia elites thought Turkey is pursuing a NeoOttomanist foreign policy. This implies that in the eyes of elites, Turkey is trying to be the
leader of Middle Eastern countries instead of pursuing a principled democratically-oriented
foreign policy. 187
Another interesting factor that gives us an idea of the conduct of Turkish foreign
policy in the post-“Arab Spring” era is people's reactions of how Turkey handled the Arab
Spring. According to TESEV's 2012 report, the percent of respondents from Tunisia who
thought that Turkey had a positive effect on the “Arab Spring” dropped to 42% in 2012 from
56% in 2011. 188
“Arab Spring”
One can analyze TFP by looking at the “Arab Spring” which started in December
2010 in Tunisia, spread to other countries, and is still continuing today. The “Arab Spring”
also put Turkey's foreign policy to a test. Along with democratization, the foreign policy
variable is also very important in explaining the decreased positive perceptions of Turkey in
the Middle East in the 2010-2013 time period. Turkey's handling of the “Arab Spring” cannot
be considered as a total failure; however, some actions of the decision-makers in Turkey
caused negative feelings among the Middle Eastern public. In terms of first reactions, some
authors 189 even considered Turkey as more successful than the Western countries since many
European countries and the United States waited too long and hesitated to urge Mubarak to
leave when millions gathered in Tahrir Square. Nevertheless, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
sent a swift message to Mubarak: “Hear the cry of the people and their extremely humane
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demands. Meet the people’s desire for change without hesitation. No government can stand
against the people.” 190
However, after Egypt, Turkish leaders started sending mixed signals. Especially in the
cases of Libya and Syria, they sent mixed signals since many Turkish interests were and still
are at stake. Turkish foreign policy took the form of a wait and see approach. Turkey’s
attempts to maintain its active foreign policy with trips by Erdogan to Tunisia, Libya, and
Egypt after the fall of their dictators, only lasted for a short period. After that, Turkish foreign
policy began to show signs of inaction and isolation. For example, Turkey should have
understood more swiftly that it needed to make alterations to its zero-problems with
neighbors policy after the Arab Spring. It was no longer possible to maintain good relations
with regimes like Bashar Al Assad's, and Turkey should have turned to a clear agenda for
democracy promotion. Instead, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu tried to convince his
counterparts in Syria to adopt democratic processes until it was obvious that the regime
would continue killing its own people.
Turkey was caught unprepared by these uprisings as many other countries were, and
Turkey, despite its democratic achievements in recent years and its activism in the region, did
not have what Kardas calls “a clear democracy promotion agenda that would have pitted
them against the authoritarian or monarchic regimes.” 191
The Turkish government was also quite confused and could not generate a consistent
foreign policy in the Libyan case. As Barkey rightly puts it: “Ankara first objected to a nofly-zone and any form of military intervention as Erdogan also argued in late February as
“what is NATO doing in Libya?” However, in March, Turkey backtracked from its initial
position and eventually agreed to NATO taking over command and control of the no-fly66

zone. Turkey sent a number of ships to evacuate wounded Libyans, and, finally, Turkey came
around to the idea that Gaddafi should leave power.” 192 Although it has been stated by the
prime minister that from the beginning of the crisis in Libya he made phone calls to Colonel
Gaddafi urging him to give power to a person with widespread support and agree to stop the
violence and killings directed at Libyan civilians, Erdogan only declared publicly on May 3,
2011(after more than two months) that Gaddafi must immediately leave power. All of these
signs show a lack of a clear agenda of democracy promotion in Turkish foreign policy. It also
shows a lack of adjustment to the crisis situation. This in turn negatively affected perceptions
of Turkey in the Middle East.
The economy variable in Hypothesis 3 is also important as an explanatory factor.
However, it will not be prominent among the determinants of perceptions of Turkey in the
2010-2013 periods unless Turkey endures an economic crisis similar to Greece and other
European countries. This is because Turkey still has a strong and growing economy and
currently is the 17th largest economy in the world. Of course, the economic losses and
obstacles to trade with Egypt, Libya, and especially Syria, which occurred because of the
“Arab Spring” and instability in the region, might have negatively affected the perception of
Turkey (though in a limited way) in the eyes of the respective publics. As an example of an
economic incident which might affect perception, Dawisha says that “In November 2011,
Turkey, which had upward of $2.5 billion in bilateral trade with Syria, suspended all financial
credit dealings with its Southern neighbor, and froze all its government's assets in Turkey.” 193
Gezi Park Incident
The Gezi Park incident started in May 28, 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey, as peaceful
protests against the government's urban development plan for Gezi Park ( which is among the
few green public places left in Istanbul) calling for the construction of a shopping mall. A few
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environmental groups started a sit-in protest after a few trees were removed. The police used
excessive force and tear gas against the protester, leading to protests spreading all across the
country. In various cities of Turkey, like the capital, Ankara, Izmir, Hatay, Bursa, Eskisehir
etc. the demonstrations included diverse groups including radical leftists, Islamists, liberals,
and secularists, all protesting against the government and Prime Minister Erdogan. For days,
until late June, thousands of people gathered every day in Taksim Square, Istanbul, where the
Gezi Park is located. The protests were broadcast all over the world by many global networks
like BBC and CNN and attracted a lot of global attention. Many people compared it to Tahrir
Square, in Egypt, although acknowledging large differences between Turkey and Mubarak's
Egypt or Ben Ali's Tunisia. After all, there is a democratically elected government ruling
Turkey. However, the protestors used the same tools, such as social networks like Facebook
and Twitter, as in the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. Thousands of pictures of alleged
government violence were shared. Pictures of atrocities committed by some protestors were
also shared by people supporting the government. The country was too polarized after this
incident.
No matter the motives behind the protests, the uncompromising position of Erdogan
and government officials (i.e. heavy handed tactics, Erdogan's calling the protestors looters
(capulcu) etc.) caused them to last a long time. Turkey's image and reputation, both regionally
and globally, were damaged. Also, since the situation was abused by extremist groups, many
private and government buildings and stores were damaged. Like many protestors (including
actors and artists) later agreed, the government’s reaction turned protests stemming from
environmental concerns into anti-government or anti-Erdogan protests. There is a reason for
this. As I previously argued, there were many undemocratic government actions before the
start of the Gezi Park protests that caused anger and frustration on the part of secular and
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liberal citizens of Turkey. There were many authoritarian actions conducted by the
government in recent years. For example, a kiss protest was organized in Ankara after a
couple kissing in the subway station were warned by municipal officials. In addition, the
government tried to regulate the sale of alcohol, and this action was deemed wrong by many
secular people in Turkey. Gezi Park is a perfect case showing how the perceptions of Arabs
will become negative when Turkey becomes or appears undemocratic. With the Gezi Park
events in May 2013, perceptions of Turkey appeared to be generally negative in Tunisian
media and newspapers.
Gezi Park in Arab Media
The repercussions of this event in the Tunisian and Arab media must be discussed. In
regards to the recent Gezi Park protests in Turkey, famous Tunisian blogger, Haythem el
Mekki, wrote using his Facebook and twitter accounts: “This would not have happened had
the Turkish government done a good job in protecting the different-minded. Turkish
government not only doesn't protect its minorities, it tries to destroy them. Welcome to the
Turkish model... Of fascism.” 194
Tunisialive (one of the few English language online newspapers in Tunisia) handled
the events by writing the following:
“Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended actions that led to mass
protests in Turkey and vowed to continue his plans to develop a controversial park in Istanbul.
Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Tunisia comes in the wake of mass demonstrations that erupted
in Taksim Square, and which spread throughout Istanbul and Ankara. The mass movement has
gathered force, with protests so far continuing for nearly a week in opposition to the perceived
authoritarianism of Erdogan and his AK Party. While his visit was intended to center around
Tunisian-Turkish relations, journalists’ questions shifted the focus to the tenuous situation
currently unfolding in Turkey.” When the journalists asked questions about the excessive use of
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force by the police and the use of tear gas, one of the Turkish officials apologized, however, the
newspaper writes, Erdogan did not offer a full apology. “There is no country that does not use
tear gas,” he asserted.
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It is obvious from the inclusion of this statement that Tunisialive portrayed Erdogan as
a stubborn and reckless Turkish prime minister who is not giving any signs of compromise or
concession to the thousands of protestors while still insisting on doing what he wanted to do
in the first place. This coverage of Erdogan’s statements by the newspaper further hurt
Turkey's image which was already damaged by the widespread coverage of the events
through television and other visual media.
Another headline from Tunisialive is as follows: “Protestors Await Turkish Prime
Minister's Arrival in Tunisia”. It goes on:
“Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will face protests here related to the serious
unrest against his government that has arisen in Turkey. In a letter published on the Nawaat
website, a group of Turkish protesters in Istanbul addressed the Tunisian people, asking them
to protest the prime minister’s arrival. According to them, Erdogan chose “to ignore those who
died and were injured because of the police brutality implemented at his orders.” Members of
the Turkish community in Tunisia and Tunisian sympathizers will stage a protest this
Thursday in front of the headquarters of the UTICA trade union.” 196

It is really striking to see Tunisian people, along with Turkish citizens living in
Tunisia, organize a protest against Erdogan in solidarity with the people of Turkey. It shows
the interest of Tunisians in democracy and human rights as well as how closely they are
following Turkey. Also, it is a measure of how negative perceptions of Turkey became when
people started protesting against a country which they long held as a model.
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In addition to the above examples of coverage, Al-Jazeera gave ample space to an
article by Tunisian political scientist, Larbi Sadiki, titled “From Taksim to Tahrir: A Turkish
'Arab Spring'?”. Sadiki summarized the protests in Turkey:
“The factors that have detonated the people’s power protest in Turkey call for special
attention: authoritarian space, single leadership cult, neo-liberalism, and youth dynamism. The
Gezi Park protest served simply as a detonator; it is both a cause and an effect. That is, it is a
cause in the sense it has quickly become a rallying symbol for channeling public outrage
against central authority and because the cumulative frustration and disaffection came to the
fore all at once. These did not only concern draconian laws about displays of affection in
public space and consumption of alcohol, but also what kind of ‘public space’ citizens are
entitled to in a democracy.” 197

Sadiki conceded that Erdogan is no Ben Ali or Mubarak and that he owes his position
to the ballot, not the bullet. 198 He also acknowledged that:
“Erdogan is credited with many political feats in Turkey: economic success, the fight against the
deep state or derin devlet, taming the historically dominant military, peace-making with the
Kurds, and, of course, solid economic performance. He has prevailed in ways that have
definitely changed Turkey: more tolerance of ethnic minorities, acceptance of Kurds and peacemaking with them, diverse media representing different views and ideologies, and confrontation
of past tragedies, including persecution of Alawites, amongst others, and the attempt to use
diplomacy to resolve questions over historical Armenian issues.”
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However, he argues that: “Erdogan’s opponents find all kinds of faults, including the
imprisonment of secular opponents and some abuses of human rights and public freedoms –
including recent laws to ban the sale of alcohol from 10pm to 6am or around mosques and
school precincts and prohibitions on displays of affection in public spaces.” 200 Sadiki further
pointed out that: “The spirit of solidarity and defiance in the face of brutality and draconian
government reactions could not be extinguished by police riot control vehicles’ water71

hoses.” 201 Most importantly, at the end he makes an argument regarding the “Model” position
of Turkey:
“One week is a long time in politics, as it is always said. The uprisings of Turkey have proved
this to be a truism. A week before the ruling AKP and its charismatic leader, Prime Minister
Erdogan, were paraded as ‘models’ for Arab Spring fledgling democracies. What is certain is that
Erdogan and his ruling party, the AKP, after Taksim Square protests will never be the same. A
page is being turned in the history of arguably the most successful Islamist party anywhere in the
Muslim world. The AKP may have no choice but to ditch Erdogan lest Erdogan condemns his
party to the proverbial dustbin of history. Henceforth, for the AKP it is a case of ‘reform or
perish’. In any case, the seeds of a Turkish Spring may have been sown in the very grounds of
the space, Gezi Park, the AKP planned to bury. Nature has a way of striking back: Gezi Park has
come so close to burying Erdogan and his party.” 202

All of Sadiki’s arguments show how intellectuals or academics in Tunisia made sense
of the protests in Turkey and how the image of Turkey was damaged in the eyes of Tunisians,
in general. In the Al-Arabiya news outlet, the protests in Turkey were also widely covered.
Examples of headlines include: “Turkey's standing man wins German rights award” 203,
“Turkey seeks to tighten grip on Twitter after protests” 204. These headlines also show how
broadly Turkey's protests attracted attention in the Arab media, which, in turn, likely affected
Arab public opinion negatively.
A different title from Al-Arabiya also reflects another bad development for Turkish
democracy and public perception: “Advocacy group cites Turkey press freedom crisis”. In the
article, the author writes:
“A prominent press freedom advocacy group is asking Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
to take steps to end what it calls a crisis for journalists in Turkey. In a letter to Erdogan dated Sept.16,
the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists cites particularly the government’s attempts to
control the coverage of recent events, including anti-government protests in June. In a report last
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year, the group raised concerns about the prosecution and imprisonment of journalists in Turkey. The
new letter, signed by CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon, says that since then the Turkish government
has engaged in heated anti-press rhetoric. It notes that senior officials, including Erdogan, have
accused media organizations of publishing false reports to destabilize the government. CPJ is also
alarmed by “reports of numerous firings and forced resignations of critical columnists, editors and
reporters, and in apparent retaliation for their coverage” of the protests.” 205

As I previously mentioned, since the current Ennahdha government is hugely popular
and widely supported by the people, Tunisian politician's views on Turkey can be used as
valid evidence of public perceptions of Turkey in Tunisia. As a reflection of the postrevolution expectations of the Tunisian politicians regarding Turkey, Ahmed Najib Chebbi,
Democratic Progressive Party leader said that: “The Tunisian population shares close
sympathy with Turkey, but to say that Turkey is a model for Tunisia would not be right.” 206
He also said that “Tunisia wants to construct a democracy, a democracy of its own.” “We'd
also like Turkey to be a stable democracy.” 207
It is important to draw attention to the (International Federation for Human Rights)
FIDH President Souhayr Belhassen's criticism of human rights violations in Turkey at the
FIDH’s 38th congress in Istanbul in front of the Turkish Interior Minister, Besir Atalay208:
“Souhayr Belhassen, who is also a Tunisian journalist and human rights activist, told the
crowd at the congress that FIDH activists had been detained arbitrarily and 16 FIDH
members were imprisoned in Bahrain, Belarus, Iran, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Turkey.” 209
While “she praised the recent release of 22 trade unionists and eight Human Rights
Association (İHD) leaders in Turkey which she said reflects the government's commitment to
improve the human rights situation in Turkey, she also added that the wife and children of
Muharrem Erbey, general vice chairperson of the Diyarbakır branch of İHD who is still in
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prison, were present in the conference hall, and she appealed to the Turkish government for
the release of Erbey.” 210
In addition, Slim Amamou, the previous short term youth minister of Tunisia and
famous blogger and activist, shared in his twitter account a picture of Turkish police. He
commented on the photo saying, “Turkish Police puts Burn Chemicals in the Water Cannon
Tanks”. He also shared the famous hashtag used by Turkish protestors, “#occupygezi,”
clearly revealing his support for the protests and condemnation of police violence. 211
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CHAPTER FIVE: GENERAL VIEWS FROM THE REGION
Instead of analyzing another country, let me shed light on the perception of Turkey by
giving examples of various other opinions from the region. This general analysis will cover
both periods from 2002-2010 and 2010-2013.
As an example of positive perceptions about Turkey, it serves to mention a personal
encounter of mine with a random Moroccan man that I came across in the Netherlands in
2008. He asked me where I was from, and when I told him that I was from Turkey, he
sincerely hugged me and told me how he loved Turkey and Prime Minister Erdogan. This
provides some evidence of the popularity of Turkey in the 2002-2010 period.
Another example, which serves as an indication of how Arab intellectuals followed
the positive developments in Turkey and mentioned it in their articles is the 2009 article of
Jouejati. In his article, Jouejati first draws attention to “Turkish-mediated indirect peace talks
between Syria and Israel in 2008 and argues that Turkey has proven to be an effective
mediator between Syria and Israel and that, if the interrupted peace talks are to resume,
Turkey must be present.” 212 He also discusses the reasons behind Erdogan's harsh criticism of
Israel and “his public rebuke of Israeli violence toward Palestinians during the January 2009
World Economic Forum in Davos.” 213 As a reflection of this disagreement in regards to
policy, he mentioned that: “Erdogan's government cancelled Israel's participation during that
October's "Anatolian Eagle" exercise--a joint NATO air force war game in Turkish skies.”214
He also talks about a shift in the foreign policy of Turkey and points to “the regional stability
Turkey seeks to promote through its "zero-problem policy"--a new Turkish regional approach
in which regional rivals would now bury the hatchet.” 215
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Azmi Bishara, a very influential Palestinian political commentator, writes that: “There
is a need for a country that could be cast as a "Sunni state" which will play an honorable role
in matters important to Arabs.” 216 He argues that “Turkey's actions are built up to signify the
emergence of a neo-Ottoman state, or even the resurgence of the Islamic caliphate.” 217
According to Bishara, “Ankara's tensions with Tel Aviv are exaggerated to the point where
some forecast a Turkish invasion of Israel in retaliation for the attack on the Freedom Flotilla,
whereas others mold Prime Minister Erdogan into the statue of the valiant hero, loyal to the
Arab/Muslim nation.” 218 He also emphasized the existence of others who are deeply bothered
and made uneasy by Turkey's actions in the Middle East. Furthermore, he discusses the
various lenses through which Turkey is viewed in the Arab world. 219 He compares the official
and public view of Turkey: “Here there exists the people without a leadership that projects
their frustrations and hopes onto Turkey. On the other hand, there is an Arab officialdom that
defies the logic of nations and that is suspicious of any nation that behaves as a nation should,
because that nation could offer a model for handling tough issues different from the
customary approach of Arab ruling families.” 220
Issandr Amrani is a North African and Egyptian analyst who started his own blog
“Arabist” which later turned into a think tank writing about the broader issues in the Arab
World. Regarding Turkey, he writes:
“Having come to see Turkey as a democracy (despite remaining problems about its treatment of
minorities and some laws left over from the military dictatorship era). In fact, the recent
constitutional changes were carried out at a time when the EU connection is getting weaker.
Yet, the perception among many is that with the changes to the constitution, the Justice and
Development Party’s government took important steps toward a more open and democratic
government that (unlike an array of reforms undertaken in 2003 and 2004) were not specifically
in response to Europe’s membership criteria.” 221
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Furthermore, regarding the Mavi Marmara incident Amrani writes: “As the most
democratic state in the Middle East, Turkey has reacted in a manner commensurate with its
public opinion and its desire for international respect. The same goes for Turkey's policy with
Syria: Turkey's policy is driven by its own interests; whereas US policy is driven by a
political desire to lend protection to Israel.” 222
Altunisik argues in her article, in which she analyzes the general Arab perspective on
Turkey, that: “There seems to be a clear correlation between the perceived changes in TFP in
the Middle East, particularly with respect to the Palestinian issue, and a more positive view
about Turkey.” 223 By citing Rami Khouri, Altunisik also argues that: “Turkey's increasing
democratization was tied to its foreign policy: such as the refusal to cooperate with the US in
Iraq and Turkey's policies during the Gaza War.” 224 She also underlined the fact that: “Some
in the Arab World thought Turkey could behave as it did because it was democratic. Also,
these authors did not fail to mention that this puts Turkey in stark contrast with other Arab
regimes.” 225
Altunisik also pointed to Khouri's arguments again as she argues that “the overall
result of Turkey's third party involvement in regional disputes has been to consolidate
Turkey's role in the region as well as benefit its image as a constructive player.” 226 She also
emphasized the importance of Turkey's democracy since “liberals, leftists, and Islamists in
the Arab World have been emphasizing Turkey's transformation and connecting it to their
criticism of the existing regimes in the region.” 227 This suggests a comparison with and
interest in Turkey especially on the part of political elites. However, if they realize Turkey is
no different than their own regimes, their perception of Turkey will worsen. This is especially
important since these elites seriously shape public opinion, as well.
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Mustafa Ellabbad, an Egyptian intellectual, also reiterated Altunisik's arguments. He
argues (by giving a glimpse about Egyptian opinions of Turkey) that AK Party's rise to power
was very critical. He writes: “In my opinion, the successful integration of a diverse range of
political groups with an Islamic background through transparent elections has been of great
interest in the Arab World. Also, the AK Party's then adherence to the basic secular principles
of the Turkish system has influenced Arab opinion of Turkey.” 228 These ideas are particularly
striking as they were argued in the year 2010; he goes on to argue that: “The Arab world is in
need of a role model, and Turkey, has, to an extent, met this need.” 229
Media Analysis
I must acknowledge that Turkey wasn't really in the Middle East in terms of attention,
before the initiation of the active foreign policy with the zero-problems with neighbors brand.
It is hard to come across articles, news covering Turkey in the early 2000's in the mainstream
media. However I refer to the news which appear in the recent years but related to the early
2000's as well.
For example, in the Al-Arabiya newspaper, Baroud points to the economic
developments in Turkey and how it contributed to the government domestically and also
raised positive perceptions of it in the region. Citing Ibrahim Ozturk, he argued: “From 2002
to 2007, Turkey experienced its longest period of uninterrupted economic growth, which
averaged 6-7 percent year on year, while annual inflation plummeted. Moreover, the economy
proved resilient following the global financial crisis, with growth recovering rapidly.” 230 He
then continued:
“One could argue that situating Turkey in suitable socioeconomic, cultural and political
contexts was one of the greatest challenges facing modern Turkish politicians. Now Turkey
seems to be offering more than just stability at home. It is also serving as a regional model to its
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neighbors, an important contribution in the age of Arab revolutions and potential political
transformations. The success of the Turkish model goes beyond the economic to sensible
political governance, democracy, and the revitalization of civil society and its many
institutions.” 231

So while highlighting economic factors, he also emphasized the importance of other
factors which together constitute the “Turkish Model” and argued that it is not without
challenges. 232
Let me also point out how Al-Jazeera portrayed Turkey and the AK Party just before
the 2007 parliamentary elections: “The AK Party's record of economic growth of seven per
cent a year on average, falling inflation and record foreign investment has won over many
Turks fed up with mismanagement, corruption, fractious coalitions and four military coups in
five decades. The party also secured coveted EU accession talks in 2005 after 40 years of
trying.” 233 This give us a sense of how Arab people positively perceived Turkey in 2007 with
this type information received from the media. The fact that Turkey, after 2005, started
accession negotiations with the EU and Arab people's knowledge about Turkey’s potential
inclusion as a member of the EU greatly helped Turkey’s popularity in the Middle East.
These facts helped give the impression Turkey as a modern state with an advanced
democracy and economy.
Another indication of a combination of democratic/human rights reform and Islamic
values in the government is the parliament's lifting of the headscarf ban in universities in
2008. This story appeared in Al-Jazeera as news and was portrayed as a development for
Turkey. Al-Jazeera mentioned “new laws allowing female students to wear the Islamic
headscarf and how Turkey's higher education watchdog warned university chiefs to allow
headscarves.” 234 Newspapers also gave space to how the Higher Education Council reacted to
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some university presidents’ insistence on still applying the ban by saying: "The tenets of the
republic... listed in the constitution guarantee the protection and progress of basic rights and
liberties and can never be used as justification for limiting the rights and liberties of
individuals." 235 One can say that this story appeared as a human rights issue and as an
improvement for Turkey in the Arab media. This arguably improved the perception of Turkey
among the Arab public, who might contrast this development in Turkey with their own
countries where they are still suffering from a lack of freedoms and similar ban on
headscarves.
Foreign Policy Activism
Turkish mediation efforts in 2008 between various actors and states in the region are
also an example of the foreign policy activism variable. Al-Arabiya handled this issue with
the caption: “Israel, Syria confirm peace talks in Turkey,” and it went on: “Israel and Syria
said on Wednesday they had launched indirect peace talks mediated by Turkish officials in
Istanbul, the first confirmation of negotiations between the long-time enemies in eight
years.” 236 The news coverage continued by pointing out that this mediation “could possibly
initiate direct talks between the two countries regarding the fate of the Golan Heights and the
possibility of Syria severing ties with Iran and guerilla movements hostile to Israel, notably
Hamas and Hezbollah.” 237
This activism was also cited in an article from Aras: “Turkey’s rise in the greater
middle east: peace building in the periphery.” Aras argued:
“Turkey’s mediating role was strengthened when Turkey moved ahead to bring Syria and Israel
together. The level of engagement, at the outset, was limited to conveying messages from each
side and the process was extremely difficult. The Israeli administration wants to contain Syria,
end the Syrian– Iranian alliance, and prevent Syrian support for Hezbollah and HAMAS. Syria
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wants the Golan Heights back unconditionally and demands Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese
lands. Turkish policy-makers are confident that they may play a constructive role in the
resolution of the Israeli–Syrian dispute. They are aware of the complicated nature of the problem
and the difficulties of bringing the sides together. However, Turkey’s new activism in the Middle
East prioritizes regional stability and security, and Turkish policy-makers aim to play a role in
initiating Israeli– Syrian negotiations.” 238

He also draws attention to Turkey's effort in the 2006 hostage crisis between Israel
and Palestine. According to Aras: “Turkey used its improved relations with Syria to help
solve the crisis of kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilat Shalit, by Palestinian groups.” 239
Al-Jazeera broadcasted an interview with the current Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet
Davudoglu, the academic who is behind the multidimensional and active Turkish foreign
policy. The program praised Turkey's diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the region. It argued
that: “Turkey is not only the bridge between Europe and Asia, in recent years; it has also
become a key diplomatic player on the world stage. Whether it is shuttle diplomacy to resolve
the recent crisis in Gaza or offering to mediate between the Americans and Iranians, Turkey
has credibility and is trusted in ways that some superpowers are not.” 240 As pointed out in the
program, Turkey also brokered peace negotiations between Hamas and Fatah in the
Palestinian territories. Turkey, along with Brazil, also tried to initiate a nuclear deal between
Iran and the West. All of these foreign policy moves were widely broadcasted by the
mainstream Arab media like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. This, in turn, shaped public opinion
on Turkey in Tunisia, like other Arab countries, in a positive way.
Davos and Mavi Marmara Crisis
The Davos Crisis in 2009 is considered one of the most important factors contributing
to the improving regional perception of Turkey. This is an example of the variable, active
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foreign policy with Islamic sensitivities and Islamic-oriented government. This event was
widely reported on in Al Arabiya. The story is as follows:
“At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Erdogan and Israeli president
Shimon Peres had a discussion of the recent Israeli assault on Gaza which left more than 1300
Palestinians dead. The Israeli president emotionally addressed the issue and argued, "Why did
they fire rockets? There was no siege against Gaza." "Why did they fight us? What did they
want? There was never a day of starvation in Gaza. What would you do if you were to have in
Istanbul every night a hundred rockets?" Peres shouted. After that, Peres was applauded by the
audience. This annoyed Erdogan as he said, "I find it very sad that people applaud what you have
said because many people have been killed." Then he tried to respond to Peres, but the
moderator, Ignatius, prevented him, telling him that it was time for a dinner break. "The
president [Peres] spoke for 25 minutes. I have only spoken for half of that," Erdogan fumed. "I
don't think I will come back to Davos because you don't let me speak," the Turkish prime
minister said, as he stood up and walked out of the conference hall in the Swiss ski resort.
"President Peres you are older than I am. Maybe you are feeling guilty and that is why you are so
strong in your words. You killed people. I remember the children who died on beaches," Erdogan
said before storming out.” 241

Al Arabiya indicated that: “Erdogan received a hero's welcome in Istanbul,
Turkey.” 242 The newspaper also gave ample space to the reactions to Erdogan’s actions: “The
Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, hailed Erdogan's move. Hamas spokesman, Fawzi
Barhum, said, "Hamas pays tribute to the courageous stand of Turkey's prime minister ... who
in Davos directly defended the victims of the criminal Zionist war against our children and
women in Gaza.” “We consider his departure from the room an expression of support for the
victims of the Holocaust carried out by the Zionists.” 243 The newspaper also pointed out how
the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, thought that Erdogan's action was
understandable: "Mr. Erdogan said what he wanted to say and then he left. That's all. He was
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right." Of Israel, he said, "They don't listen." 244 Positive perceptions of Turkey and Erdogan
in the Middle East skyrocketed after this event.
Al-Jazeera also took Davos to their headlines: “Erdogan hailed after Davos walkout”.
Like Al-Arabiya, Al Jazeera also positively portrayed the crisis which was also dubbed as the
“One Minute”. The newspaper mostly put forward positive views of Erdogan's rebuke,
mentioning the views of Tony Blair and Amr Moussa 245. It also cited Gareth Evans'(the
president of the International Crisis Group think-tank) views: “In particular, what was
depressing was Peres' utter unwillingness to acknowledge the real significance of the Arab
peace initiative. Turkey was Israel's best friend in the Muslim world. I think Israel has to
come to grips with the fact that it has alienated a very large proportion of the world's
population." 246 After this important coverage from the mainstream Arab media of Turkey and
Erdogan as supporters of Arab and Muslim causes, Turkey's popularity significantly
increased on the Arab street.
The final event to discuss is the Mavi Marmara crisis. In 2010, Israel attacked an aid
ship called Mavi Marmara on its way to Gaza which was sent by a Turkish NGO. Nine
Turkish citizens, and many other international activists, were killed in the assault by Israeli
soldiers in international waters. After these tragic events, Turkish-Israeli relations seriously
deteriorated. This event, which was widely publicized in the Arab media, also improved
perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East and made Turkey seem like a champion of Arab
causes which would even give up martyrs when necessary in the eyes of Arabs. With this
event, Turkey was perceived by many as doing more than other Arab countries for such
causes. 247
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2010 Constitutional Referendum
The 2010 Constitutional Referendum and its portrayal in Arab media provide more
evidence for analysis. First of all, this event is a good example of democratization in the
2002-2010 as identified in the main hypothesis. At the time this was considered by many as
an important step for the improvement of Turkish democratic standards. Turkey was still
ruled by a constitution written by the generals behind the coup in 1980, and this referendum
was merely a matter of approving constitutional changes. However, it was still an important
symbolic move by the Turkish government, as it coincided with the anniversary of the
military coup in 1980. The 2010 constitutional changes were an indication of improvement in
Turkey's democracy as reflected by the referendum’s motto: “Yes but not enough.”
According to Al jazeera:
“Turks have voted on constitutional changes that could reshape the judiciary and curb the powers
of the military in a referendum seen as a tussle between an Islamist-influenced government and
its secular opponents, mainly in the army. Erdogan has said changes are needed to strengthen
democracy and bring Turkey closer to European norms, as the country continues its bid to join
the European Union (EU)."Turkish democracy is at a turning point today, we are sitting an
important test," Erdogan said after voting in Uskudar district of Istanbul.” 248

Let me point to another news article, also from Aljazeera:
“On September 12, 2010, exactly thirty years after the 1980 military coup, Turkish voters went
to the polls to vote on the largest constitutional amendment since the current constitution was
adopted in 1982.The 26-article amendment package, passed in the Turkish Grand Assembly and
approved by President Gul, introduces a number of progressive changes into the Turkish political
and judicial system. The 58 per cent 'yes vote' is a victory for the process of democratization in
Turkey. The amendments seek to cure the many deficits of the current constitution drafted by the
army generals who carried out the 1980 military coup. They aim at expanding the sphere of
individual rights and civil liberties, bringing the standards of Turkish democracy closer to that of
the European Union (EU) in which Turkey is seeking full membership. The new changes
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include, among others, the establishment of ombudspersons, ensuring positive discrimination for
children, women and the handicapped, and collective bargaining for public workers.” 249

I argue that Turkey is still using the same constitution and must have a brand new one
(not just changes of some articles) and this is a very important necessity indicated by both the
EU and other international agencies. However this news coverage obviously display an image
of a democratically advanced Turkey in the eyes of Arab public.
Turkish Television Series
Another factor that positively affected the perception of Turkey in the Middle East is
Turkish TV series. The role of Turkish soaps has been also reflected in Al Arabiya newspaper
in the news from 2008.
“Romantic, entertaining, relatable and inspirational, which is how most of the 85
million people who tuned into the finale of the most popular series ‘Noor’ described it. Noor,
originally 'Gumus' in Turkish, told the story of a young woman who married a powerful yet
romantic and loving man named Muhanad. The way the show portrayed women and men in a
Muslim family was unconventional by Arab standards and aroused the curiosity of millions. In
2008, Saudi-owned MBC group dubbed the soap into colloquial Arabic and gave it on its popular
channel MBC4 and the show took off, becoming a television phenomenon. Noor took the Arab
world by storm, as its popularity inspired countless discussions by media analysts and were
audiences immediately hooked. The show became a socio-cultural phenomenon, as three to four
million people tuned in to Noor every night, making it the highest rated show ever in recent Arab
television history. “I used to schedule my day around Noor and made sure I was home at least
half an hour before it started," Lara, a 25-year-old Lebanese national, told AlArabiya.net, adding
that she was obsessed with the show and would sometimes spend hours on the phone discussing
the characters and plot lines.” 250

According to the newspaper “the main criticism came from

highest religious

authority of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, who considered Noor ‘subversive’
and ‘un-Islamic,’ calling on Muslims to be wary of the “evils” in the show.” 251 Dr. Craig
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Hayden, who studied the Arab media, argued that: “The fact that the fatwas were mostly
ignored shows religious authorities no longer have the kind of control that they wish they had
over media content and there are other organizations that they have to share their authority
with. The one thing that stands out (about Noor) is the role of the man as supportive and not
necessarily a primary character…the couple is portrayed as equal and not in a hierarchical
relationship.” 252
Also related to Turkish soaps; Semih Idiz reasoned why the shows were watched so
much in the Arab World and how they raised Turkey's popularity. While trying to explain
Turkey's popularity, he argued in Al-Monitor that: “Whether Turkey’s secular parliamentary
democracy provides a model for Arabs clamoring for a democratic future remains an open
question. That Turkey’s cultural influence is spreading across the Middle East, with social
implications that anger Islamists, however, is indisputable.” 253 He also draws attention to the
various other factors that affected Turkey's perception: “Curiosity towards Turkey gave way
to deep admiration when Erdogan blasted Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos, in January
2009.” 254 He further argues:
“The assumption that Turkey’s increasing popularity in the Middle East is driven
solely by the rise of the Islamist AK Party, and Erdogan’s stand on Israel, however is proving to
be not completely true. The influence of Turkish television soap operas, which are opening Arab
minds to alternative lifestyles and modern living, is also being felt across the Arab world today.
But it is the depiction of modern living, and the civilized relationships between men and women,
that provides the principle attraction. All of this and much more exists in Western soaps, of
course. But people in the Middle East appear to be saying, “Why look to the West with its alien
and anti-Arab culture, when one can get inspiration from a Turkey, which is modern but whose
culture is not alien, given our shared religion and history.” One follower of the TV series said
these productions showed that one could be Muslim and modern at the same time.”
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Let me get back to the democratization in Turkey again. Right after the Gezi Park
events in Turkey, Rami G. Khouri who is an influential Palestinian academic wrote an article
in the Cairo Review journal (published in Egypt), which I believe affected public opinion on
Turkey. He argued that: “The full impact of the sudden demonstrations across Turkey against
the policies and style of the Erdogan government will become clear in the weeks ahead.
Social media have given the world a more complete picture of events on the ground, along
with high quality analyses by Turkish and foreign analysts that clarify the many reasons for
the protests, in contrast with mainstream media in Turkey that have censored themselves
shamefully.” 256 He also compared Turkey and Jordan and argued that: “The link between
citizen and state is still being negotiated in almost every country in the region.” 257
Also in another article Khouri compared Turkey, Egypt, and Brazil. He argued that the
protests are the outcome of the majoritarian type of democracies where the demands of 49%
of citizens might not be satisfied. He also directs attention to the increasing arrogance of the
elected politicians and their indifference to the silent majority who did not vote for them and
who are increasingly disturbed by the policies of their governments. 258
Also a news article published in Al-Sharq Al Awsat writes:
“The European Union decided Tuesday to revive long-dormant EU membership talks with
Turkey, but not until later this year because of the government’s heavy-handed crackdown on
street protests in Istanbul and elsewhere earlier this month. Germany and others blocked them
because of concerns that such negotiations could appear to endorse the crackdown on the
demonstrations, which rights groups say has left thousands injured. The protests began in
Istanbul on May 31 and quickly turned into widespread demonstrations against the heavy-handed
crackdown and against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian and
meddlesome ways. Erdogan, who took power a decade ago, denies he is authoritarian and, as
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evidence of his popularity, points to elections in 2011 that returned his party to power with
almost 50 percent of the vote and gave him a third term in office.” 259

This news article elaborates the negative image of Turkey which emerged after the
Gezi Park incident and points to the discussions related to Turkey’s EU membership and
objections to it.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS
This study attempted to find answers to the research questions: 1) What factors affect
perception of Turkey in the Middle East? 2) Why does the popularity of Turkey in the Middle
East increase/decrease?
In the introduction, I highlighted the burden of history in the relations between Turkey
and Middle Eastern countries. Turkey's long time isolation and neglect in the Middle East and
its long term alliance with Western countries during the Cold War formed historical
prejudices from many Arabs. This appeared to be an alternative argument. However, with the
development of my research, we see that it had only a minor effect on the regional relations
and perception. With the AK Party's rise to power and positive and active engagement with
the region, we see that this historical legacy can be easily overcome.
2002-2010
First of all, I argued that the AK Party's rise to power with free and fair parliamentary
elections of 2002 was the result of democracy in Turkey. Arabs understood that even
Islamists can take power with the help of democracy. The AK Party's insistence on
democratization in the 2002-2010 era with reforms curbing the military's influence in politics
and many constitutional amendments for the purpose of EU membership were also crucial in
this sense. Finally, when these efforts of the AK Party government gave fruit with the opening
of EU accession negotiations in 2005, perceptions of Turkey became very positive in the
Arab world. Turkey’s democratic advancements and EU aspirations showed how modern
Turkey is in the eyes of liberal and leftist Arabs. Many considered Turkey as a model as the
most advanced Muslim democracy. They have also been aware of the fact that Turkey was
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proposed as a model by the US and many European countries with its secular system and
democracy.
The prospects of Turkey's EU membership also excited many Islamists in the region
as this implied that Turkey could serve as a bridge between the West and Arabs. Some
Islamists became suspicious about the secular nature of the “Turkish Model” and did not trust
the AK Party, but most of these Islamists became marginalized later. Most of the Islamists
admired Turkey's Muslim-sensitive foreign policy moves. Also, as I observed, a
democratically advanced Turkey that solves its internal problems with reforms and openings
like the Kurdish Initiative drew a picture of a stable and peaceful country in the eyes of many
Arabs. Finally, the 2010 Constitutional Referendum and many democratic changes coming
with it raised many people’s perception of Turkey, since it was reflected in mainstream Arab
media and the works of intellectuals. Also, according to TESEV's perception of Turkey poll
in 2010, in general favorable opinions of Turkey increased from 75% in 2009 to 85% in 2010
in the Middle East. 260
Almost as important as democratization, the foreign policy activism variable turned
out to be significant in the 2002-2010 eras as hypothesized. I found during case studies of
Egypt and Tunisia that Turkey's rise in the Middle East with a new foreign policy based on
zero problems with neighbors increased its popularity on the Arab streets. In fact, it seems
that Turkey's activism and rise in the Middle East began in 2003 with its refusal to allow
American troops to use its soil for the Iraqi invasion. Arab elites and people saw how people's
voices and demands were reflected in the decisions of policy-makers in Turkey. Contrary to
the Turkish military's(which has been a key player in the domestic and foreign policy
decisions of Turkey for a long period) positive attitude to allow US troops through the
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country, the Turkish parliament's decision showed that Turkey is no longer the pawn of
Western countries and American interests in the region. This, in turn, positively affected its
perception. Turkey's mediation and peace building efforts in this period were also critical.
Brokering negotiations between Syria and Israel and Fatah and Hamas as well as initiating
nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West were among Turkey's activism. As a result of
this foreign policy activism, Turkey became a non-permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council. This was also very important in the eyes of both the Arab political elite and
public.
An Islamic-oriented government and Erdogan's charisma are also very significant
factors leading to the popularity of Turkey in the Middle East during this period. An Islamist
party's(although the party does not define itself so) rise into power in the 2002 elections in
Turkey and its huge success, both politically and economically, inspired a lot of Islamists in
the region who had been desperately struggling with authoritarian regimes. Many Islamists,
including Ennahdha in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, considered Turkey as a
model. Although the AK Party did not prioritize Islam in its party propaganda and called
itself a Conservative-Democrat party, it is well known both in Turkey and Arab world that the
founders of AK Party originated in an Islamist Welfare Party and actively participated in
politics in the 1990's. The apparent success of an Islamist party in a strictly secular system
without making any references to sharia law and trying to be a member of the European
Union created a modern and positive image of Turkey in the eyes both Arab liberals and
Islamists. Also another factor which is seemingly important is foreign policy with an Islamic
brand or with Islamic sensitivities. Here we also see the factor which some scholars call the
“Erdogan Effect”.
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The newspapers and opinions of political elites in the Arab world indicate that,
starting from the 2008 Gaza attack, Erdogan's criticisms of Israel were a critical factor which
raised perceptions of Turkey and put it into a position as the defender of Arab and Muslim
causes. These rebukes or so called foreign policy booms were critical in this sense. For
example, it can be argued that the 2009 Davos or “One Minute” Crisis with Israel made
Erdogan the figurative king of the Arab streets. In World Public Opinion's 2009 poll,
Erdogan's popularity is 63% in both Egypt and the Palestinian territories which indicates
positive perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East at that time. It is also higher than the
perception of global leaders such as Putin and Obama. 261 More popular than many Arab
leaders, Erdogan’s pictures were held aloft and Turkish flags were waved after this event.
The Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, in which some Turkish citizens were even killed,
further boosted Arab perceptions of Turkey. With this event, Turkey, in the eyes of Arabs,
became the fiercest defender of Palestinian cause. Also, after this crisis, Turkey's relations
with Israel were the worst since the foundation of Israel in 1948. This suggests that there
might be an understanding among Arabs that Turkey would even sacrifice its relations with
Israel and its economic interests for Arab causes.
The economic development of Turkey in the 2002-2010 time period is also an
important reason for Turkey's popularity in the Middle East. After reviewing the literature of
both Turkish and Arab scholar's opinions about this issue, as well as examining Arab media
and the opinions of political elites, one can safely argue that economic development raised
perceptions of Turkey in the region. Arab people, especially when they come to Turkey as
tourists, are surprised with the level of development and standards of living which contrast to
situations in their countries. Turkey emerged as an important exporter in the 21st century and
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became the 17th largest economy in the world. This was perceived favorably in the region.
Furthermore, increased trade and economic deals with all of the countries in the Middle East
extended Turkey's presence and profile in the region.
Finally Turkish TV series were very effective in shaping Arab public opinion on
Turkey. When I analyzed the mainstream media like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, I found out
that Turkish soap operas had an enormous positive effect on Turkey's perception in the
region. The image of modern Turkey given in these shows with equal relations between men
and women and the image of romantic and caring Turkish men greatly increased Turkey's
popularity. Millions of Arab people watched these Turkish soaps every day and admired and
envied the Turkish way of life.
Table 3 Key Incidents that Positively Affected Perception of Turkey in the time period 20022010
2002

Election of the AK Party

2003

Refusal to allow American troops use Turkish terroritory for the
Iraqi invasion

2005

Start of EU accession negotiations for full membership

2007-2009

Turkey’s mediation efforts between various countries and actors

2009

Davos Crisis and Erdogan’s criticism of Israel

2010

Mavi Marmara Crisis and deterioration of relations with Israel

2010

Constitutional amendments

2002-2010

Democratic improvements and general reforms

2002-2010

Economic development

2005-2010

Fame and spread of Turkish TV series
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2010-2013
After 2010, the Turkish government generally lost its reformist spirit. This happened
after the AK Party was elected with almost 50% majorities in the 2011 elections. This seemed
to cause overconfidence and even arrogance for some since Erdogan called the new period
starting with the 2011 election victory as the “mastery term”. The democratic reforms and EU
membership process slowed down and almost vanished. As a result of this, the perception of
Turkey in the Middle East was negatively affected, too. Many incidents indicating creeping
authoritarianism occurred in Turkey. Turkey began to lose its most valuable democratic
achievements which had made it very popular in the eyes of the Arab public. Erdogan
disliked and could not bear any criticisms that appeared in the Turkish media. Many
journalists and columnists were fired for being too critical of the government. Many EU and
foreign reports emerged which criticized the government and showed the lack of press and
internet freedom in Turkey. Reports mentioned many jailed journalists and thinkers and
referenced the Ergenekon case. 262 According to the current Freedom House data Turkey, is
still considered only partly free including press and internet freedom. 263
Some articles 264 appeared in the mainstream Turkish media, especially in newspapers
known to support the government since it rose to power, which discussed the idea that there is
a majoritarian understanding of democracy in Turkey which leads incumbent governments to
believe that they can do whatever they want since they were elected by the majority.
According to this understanding, incumbents do not have to care about the demands and
concerns of the other 50% who did not vote for them. It was argued that Islamists in Turkey
and the Arab World might not be able to solve their problems with democracy.
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While the other variables, such as economic development, Islamic oriented
government and Turkish TV series were very effective during the 2010-2013 periods, one can
argue that the foreign policy activism variable did not have much of an impact.
Based on analysis of many opinions from Arab political elites and news sources, it
seems that some foreign policy failures during this period, especially right after the “Arab
Spring,” negatively affected the perception of Turkey in the Middle East. Equivocal Turkish
reactions to the “Arab Spring” and the failure to transform and update its policy of “zero
problems with neighbors”, according to the new conditions emerging with the “Arab Spring,”
made Turkey open to criticisms and, in turn, negative perceptions. Turkey was also quite
isolated from the region and could not maintain its activism, such as mediation efforts and
good relations with countries after the “Arab Spring”. Moreover Turkey's recent Egypt policy
seriously reduced its popularity in that country. According to news reports, many Egyptians
disliked Erdogan's clear support of the Muslim Brotherhood after the coup. Also, in TESEV's
2012 survey, only 42 percent of the respondents thought that Turkey had a positive effect on
the Arab Spring, compared to 56 percent back in 2011. 265 It clearly shows a negative
perception of Turkey recently which can be explained as a result of Turkey’s relatively
unsuccessful foreign policy after the Arab Spring and a trend towards authoritarianism after
2010.
Findings
The initial hypothesis was that the democratization of Turkey is the most effective
variable explaining Turkey's popularity. In particular I argued that: H1: As the level of
internal democratization increases in Turkey the regional perception of Turkey will increase
as well. Consistent with that, the case studies showed that the democratic reforms which were
implemented in Turkey in the 2002-2010 time period and also Turkey's coherent blending of
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Islam and democracy was the most important factor creating a positive perception of Turkey
in the Middle East. Likewise the worsening of democratization in Turkey with the lack of
necessary reforms and spirit on the part of the government, as well as a trend towards
authoritarianism, negatively affected the regional perception of Turkey in the 2010-2013 time
period.
I also tested Hypothesis 1 using the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Especially during the
Gezi Park events in 2013, it seems that the perception and image of Turkey greatly correlates
with the status of democracy in Turkey. When negative articles and information about
Turkey’s democratic standards appear in the Arab media and are included in the speeches of
politicians, the perception of Turkey will become more negative. The case of Gezi Park once
again made it clear how greatly Turkey's popularity depends on its internal democratic
standards. I observed this in the vast amount of news and information provided to the Arab
public in both case studies. Also, the 2012 Perception of Turkey report published by TESEV
included a question on Turkey's role in the Middle East. It shows that the number of people
saying “Turkey is a successful example of the coherence of Islam and democracy” declined
from 67% in 2011 to 58% in 2012. 266 I argue that this change is because Turkey did not
maintain its image of being an advanced democracy after 2010. It is likely that TESEV's 2013
report will find even more negative results.
This study’s research suggests that, from more democratically experienced countries
to less democratically experienced ones, interest in democratization inside and out of those
countries will decline in the Middle East. In other words, the Arab public in those countries
which have experienced the “Arab Spring” will have more interest and demands for
democratization while countries which have not experienced the “Arab Spring” or any other
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rights movements will have less or no interest. This is related to Turkey in the sense that
interest in Turkey's own democratization process and achievements will be minor or
nonexistent in those countries which have no democratic political culture or civil society. A
more positive perception due to democratic advances in Turkey will not be the case in these
kinds of countries, nor will these countries have a worsening perception due to a more
“authoritarian Turkey”. Foreign policy actions such as being critical of Israel and political
personalities such as Turkey's prime minister, Erdogan, and his well-known Davos “one
minute” fury will be more effective. Turkish TV series and bilateral trade with those countries
will also positively change their perceptions of Turkey. This research examined, not just
democracy, but the effects of other variables as well, such as foreign policy activism.
Although the importance and vitality of democratization inside Turkey was obvious, the
necessity of other factors such as the economy and foreign policy were found to be critical in
explaining changes in Arab perceptions of Turkey.
It is a humble prediction of this paper that, as long as the Turkish government
continues reforms and progress towards democratization, the popularity of Turkey in the
Middle East will increase. This would be in line both with the government’s goal of European
Union membership and also the vital need for an advanced democracy to enable the existence
of a stable, prosperous, and peaceful Turkey. However, if Turkey draws the perception of
being a less democratic or even authoritarian country, as observed in the Gezi Park protests
(which became widespread with the international media), then Turkey’s image as a
democratic and secular country would be seriously damaged and perceptions of Turkey will
become more negative as they did in 2012. Positive perceptions will continue to decline in
the next few years and will be proportional to the demands for freedom and human rights in
the Arab world. It will also no longer be possible to even talk about the “Turkish Model”
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which was offered as a harmonious example of Islam and democracy or as inspiration for the
countries in the Middle East. The Turkish government must be careful about its democratic
image if the officials are concerned about Turkey’s soft power in the region. Such care is also
very critical in maintaining good relations with the Arab public and for the public diplomacy
of Turkey. In terms of foreign policy, Ankara must be careful, too. Turkey can no longer be
isolated and indifferent to the problems or crises in the region. Therefore, Turkey must
carefully determine and adjust its policies toward the region to gain better perceptions and
maintain its soft power.
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